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Smoking Out Big Tobacco:
Some Lessons About Academic Freedom,
The World Wide Web, Media
Conglomeration, and Public Service
Pedagogy from the Battle Over the
Brown & Williamson Documents
Clay Calvert*
In May 1994, a box of documents arrived mysteriously, unsolicited,
and without a return address at the office of Dr. Stanton A. Glantz,
Professor of Medicine at the University of California, San Francisco
(UCSF).' Its contents ultimately provided powerful evidence for

* Assistant Professor of Communications and Associate Director of the Pennsylvania Center for the First Amendment at Pennsylvania State University. J.D., 1991,
McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific; Ph.D., 1996, Stanford University.
1. Bill Kisliuk, Mystery Tobacco Papers Fuel Litigation, LEGAL TamS, May 29,
1995, at 2. The Federal Express package identified the sender of the documents only
as Mr. Butts. Id. Mr. Butts is a character in the Doonesbury cartoon strip-"a
smooth-talking lobbyist with the body of a cigarette." Dave Thorn, Tobacco Company
Loses Bid to Suppress Papers, RECORDER (S.F.), May 26, 1995, at 3. The cartoon
character "serves as an irony-free public relations flack for the tobacco industry."
Kisliuk, supra, at 2.
Copies of the documents, allegedly stolen by a paralegal at a law firm that represented Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., were also sent to members of Congress. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 412 (D.C. Cir.
1995). Brown & Williamson's attorney, Kenneth W. Starr, lost an effort to compel
production of these documents from Congressman Henry A. Waxman, Chairman of
the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, and Representative Ron Wyden. Id. at 423. In that case, the
Speech or Debate Clause of the United States Constitution prevented production of
the documents. Id, The federal appellate court observed that Brown & Williamson's
claim "is to a right to engage in a broad scale discovery of documents in a congressional file that comes from third parties," however, "[tihe Speech or Debate Clause
bars that claim." Id. The Clause provides that "for any Speech or Debate in either

Glantz's damning conclusions against the tobacco industry in his controversial 1996 book, The CigarettePapeni.2
Glantz, a longtime anti-smoking advocate, and his four co-authors
determined, after exhaustive review of the box's documents, that one of
the nation's largest cigarette manufacturers, Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,3 knew for more than thirty years that cigarettes are addictive and that they cause disease.! Furthermore, the company took active measures to suppress this knowledge and engaged in numerous
legal, advertising, and public relations efforts to obfuscate the dangers
of smoking.5 The documents, and the conclusions drawn from them,
add more fuel to the roaring, Food and Drug Administration (FDA)stoked fire against the tobacco industry. '

House, [members of Congress] shall not be questioned in any other place." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. A complete discussion of the discovery issue in Brown &
WiUiamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams is beyond the scope of this Article.
2. STANTON A. GLANTz ET AL., THE CIGARErrE PAPERS (1996). More than 20 major
publishing houses turned the book down, fearful of legal liability, before the University of California Press picked it up. Lisa M. Krieger, Crusader. UCSF Researcher
Stanton Glantz's One-Man War Against Big Tobacco, S.F. EXAMINER MAG., June 2,
1996, at 8, 10. In his foreword to the book, former United States Surgeon General C.
Everett Koop calls The Cigarette Papers "a vital weapon in the battle against tobacco." C. Everett Koop, Foreword to GLANTz gr AL., supra, at xv. "I do not believe that
anyone who reads it can remain passive in the stxuggle against tobacco." Id. One reviewer of the book observed that it is difficult to read it "without wondering how
the government has so conspicuously, and for so long, failed to grasp the nettle of
cigarettes." Paul Reldinger, Smoke and Mirrors, 82 A.B.A. J. 104 (1996).
3. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., a ui.t of London-based B.A.T. Industries
PLC with its principal place of business in Louisville, Kentucky, is the nation's third
largest tobacco company. Suein L Hwang & Milt Geyelin, Getting Personak Brown &
Williamson Has 500-Page Dossier Attacking Chief Critic, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 1996,
at Al. Tobacco is a $46 billion industry. Alix M. Freedman et aL, Tort TV CBS Legal
Guarantees To '60 Minutes' Source Muddy Tobacco Story, WAL ST. J., Nov. 16, 1995,
at Al. Today, "for the first time since the early 1960s, America's cigarette market has
stopped shrinidng." Still Smokin': Improbably, Tobacco Companies Are Far From
Finished, EcoNoMIsT, Mar. 11, 1995, at 61 [hereinafter Still Smokin. In 1994, Brown
& Williamson held an 11.396 share of the cigarette market. Id at 62.
4. GLANTZ ET AL, supra note 2, at 13. The Brown & Williamson documents can
be accessed for free on the Web at <http://www.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/bw.htm>.
5. GLANn'Z ET AL, supra note 2.

6. See generally Jeffrey Goldberg, Next Target, Nicotine, N.Y. TmMS MAG., Aug. 4,
1996, at 22, 24 (describing the work of David A. Kessler, Commissioner of the FDA,
in "his Clinton-anointed role as Public Enemy No. 1 of Big Tobacco").
The government's war against the tobacco industry heated up in August, 1996,
when President Bill Clinton approved a new set of stringent FDA regulations targeting billboards, signs, and print advertisements for cigarettes. Stephen Barr & Martha
M Hamilton, Clinton Curtails Tobacco Ads in Bid to Cut Sales to Youth, WASH.
POST, Aug. 24, 1996, at Al. The regulations, aimed at reducing teenage smoking, ban
billboard advertising of tobacco products within 1000 feet of a school or playground,
limit print advertisements in publications with significant youth readership to a black-
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and-white, text-only format, and prohibit brand-name sponsorship of sporting events.
Id.; Peter T. ilIborn, Clinton Approves a Series of Curbs on Cigarette Ads, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 24, 1996, at 1, 8. The restrictions on commercial speech raise new and
complex First Amendment issues. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, FDA's Tobacco Ad Rules
Face Lengthy Court Challenge, WASH. PosT, Aug. 24, 1996, at A9; Barnaby J. Feder,
Long Legal Fight Seen Likely Over New Curbs on Tobacco, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 24, 1996,
at 8. A discussion of these First Amendment-related issues, however, is beyond the
scope of this Article. For more information on this issue, see generally Daniel
Helberg, Butt Out: An Analysis of the FDA's Proposed Restrictions on Cigarette Advertising under the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 29 LoY. LA. L REV. 1219 (1996).
In addition to heat from the federal government, states' attorneys general have
applied increasing pressure to the tobacco industry. In August 1996, Oklahoma became the fourteenth state to sue tobacco companies on fraud-based theories to recover health care and Medicaid costs for llnesses caused by tobacco industry products.
Oklahoma Sues Tobacco irms, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 1996, at AS. The tobacco industry often places intense pressure on states' attorneys general not to file such lawsuits. John Schwartz, Tobacco Industry Lawyers Press State Attorneys General Not to
Sue, WAH. PosT, May 1, 1996, at Al.
San Francisco became the first city to sue the tobacco industry for recovery of
health care-related costs in early June 1996. Reynolds Holding, S.F. Becomes First
City to Sue Tobacco Firms, S.F. CHRON., June 7, 1996, at Al. The San Francisco
lawsuit alleges that six tobacco companies, including Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., lied about the dangers of smoking and intentionally concealed the results of
research harmful to the cigarette industry. Id.
In August 1996, Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. lost a $750,000 jury verdict
in a Florida case brought by a man who developed lung cancer after smoking for 43
years Suein L Hwang et al., Jury's Tobacco Verdict Suggests Tough Times Ahead for
the Industry, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 1996, at Al.
Currently, the tobacco indtstry faces a deluge of litigation on all fronts. As Morton Mintz wrote in late 1995, "Each week in Washington seems to bring a new antismoking challenge." Morton Mintz, Where There's Smoke, WASH. POST MAG., Dec. 3,
1995, at W20.
Common theories of relief used by states' attorneys general and personal injury
attorneys include fraud, negligent misrepresentation, emotional distress, negligence,
violation of consumer protection statutes, breach of express and implied warranties,
strict liability (failure to warn as well as defective design and manufacturing theories), conspiracy, and unjust enrichment Richard A. Daynard & Graham E. Kelder,
The Tobacco Industry Under Fire, TRiAL, Nov. 1995, at 20, 22.
In late summer of 1996, Congress proposed to states' attorneys general and to
tobacco companies a deal that largely would end tobacco litigation. David Segal, Plan
to End Lawsuits Could Snuff Out Tobacco's Army, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 1996, at F7.
Richard Scruggs, a Mississippi attorney and long-time foe of cigarette makers, drafted
the proposal. Id. United States Senator Trent Lott (R-Miss.) is Scruggs's brother-inlaw. Id.
One cigarette manufacturer, Liggett Group, Inc., broke from the ranks of its
colleagues in 1996 by offering to settle a class-action lawsuit filed against it. Lorraine
Woellert, Tobacco Giants Refuse to Follow Liggett Offer, WAH. ThAS, Mar. 14, 1996,

Given the explosive, revealing nature of the documents 7 it is not surprising that a fierce legal battle ensued between the University of California and Brown & Williamson over their retention and dissemination.'
Approximately 4000 copies of Brown & Williamson internal memoranda
and correspondence between company Lawyers, many labeled "confidential" or "privileged" and dating from the 1950s through the 1980s,
were allegedly stolen.' This Article analyzes the legal fight over those
documents and its free speech implications. Moreover, it contrasts the
bold course taken by UCSF with that of two major broadcast news
organizations, ABC and CBS, in their recent run-ins with the tobacco
industry.
Brown & Williamson claimed the documents were privileged and
stolen by a former paralegal employed by one of its law firns."° The

cigarette manufacturer feared, correctly, that personal injury plaintiffs
and state governments suing the company would make end-runs around
established discovery procedures to obtain the documents." Plaintiffs
could simply access the documents at the UCSF Archive Library or on
UCSF's World Wide Web home page. This access avoids traditional
requests for production of documents and near-certain discovery disputes over attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine, and trade
secret status. 2

at B7. However, Liggett is the smallest of the nation's five major tobacco companies,
and the larger companies have not followed its lead. Id.
7. The documents have been described as 'a potential smoking gun that could
shape four multimillion-dollar cases filed against the tobacco companies." Kisliuk,
supra note 1, at 2.
8. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., No. 967298
(Super. Ct. Cal. S.F. County dismissed Feb. 7, 1996).
9. Kisliuk, supra note 1, at 6.
10. Id. at 2.
11. Id. At the time of the dispute in Regents of University of California, Florida,
Minnesota, Mississippi, and West Virginia had filed suits against the tobacco industry
alleging causes of action for unjust enrichment, fraud, conspiracy, and negligence.
Amici Curiae Brief of the Attorney Generals of Florida, Minnesota, Mississippi, and
West Virginia at 1, Regents of Univ. of Cal (No. 967298).
12. The fears of counsel for Brown & Williamson were apparently borne out. In
particular, Brown & Williamson alleged with Glanl's deposition that Glantz provided
a copy of the documents to plaintiffs' counsel in the well-publicized federal classaction lawsuit, Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995),
rev'd, 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996). Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Application for Writ of Possession at 3, Regents of Univ. of Cal. (No.
967298). The appellate court decertified the class in Castano on May 23, 1996.
Castano, 84 F.3d at 734.
Brown & Williamson, although maintaining that the attorney-client privilege and
work product doctrine protected the documents, eventually abandoned its claim that
the documents contained trade secrets. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Opposition to Application for Writ of Possession and Preliminary Injunction at 11 n.4,
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The University of California, on the other hand, invoked the First
Amendment 3 to retain possession of the documents, arguing that the
papers were of "enormous public and academic interest and importance" and that providing scientists, historians, and members of the
general public with library and Internet access to them was essential.14
The University took the position that an order forbidding UCSF from
publishing or disseminating the documents would be a prior restraint
on speech."
The University also claimed the documents were part of the public
domain, already "in the hands of many of the nation's major news organizations and ... the subject of numerous news reports that have disclosed their contents."16 Brown & Williamson's legal maneuvering to

Regents of Univ. of Cal. (No. 967298).
13. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent
part, that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press." U.S. CONsT. amend. L The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses have been
incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause to apply to
state and local governments. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652, 666 (1925).
14. Opposition to Motion to Compel at 1, Regents of Univ. of Cal. (No. 967298).
15. A prior restraint on speech, as compared to a subsequent punishment for
speech already communicated, is "the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights." Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559
(1976). The United States Supreme Court has held that "[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its
constitutional validity." Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
Prior restraints generally take the form of either administrative schemes for the
licensing and prescreening of speech or judicial prohibitions against publication such
as injunctions and gag orders. MARc A. FRANKLiN & DAVID A. ANDERSON, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON MASS MEDIA LAW 78-80 (5th ed. 1996). An injunction "is a writ or order
requiring a person to refrain from a particular act." CAL CIv. PROC. CODE § 525
(West 1979). See generally Kelli L Sager et al., Prior Restraint in the 90s: TwentyFive Years After the Pentagon Papers, in 1 LITIGATING LIBEL AND PRIVAcY SunTs 517
(1996) (providing a thumbnail review of recent prior restraint cases).
16. Opposition to Motion to Compel at 2, Regents of Univ. of CaL (No. 967928).
As the American Heart Association, American Cancer Society, and other related heartand-lung organizations stated in their memorandum of amici curiae in Regents of
University of California:
Beginning on May 7, 1994 the content of these documents have [sic] been
discussed in almost every major newspaper in the United States. The New
York Times ran lengthy stories on May 7, 1994, June 16, 1994 and June 17,
1994. The Washington Post ran the first of its stories on these documents on
May 14, 1994. The Los Angeles Times ran stories on these documents in both
May and August of 1994. Businessweek devoted an entire page to these docu-

recover the documents amounted, the University contended, to a Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP) suit designed to suppress informed public dialogue about the dangers of smoking. 7
The ensuing battle was not a typical First Amendment case. The dispute between the cigarette manufacturer and the academic institution
did not involve a "traditional" media defendant. Neither a journalist nor
a newspaper nor television network was involved. The case also did not
feature a cause of action, such as libel 8 or invasion of privacy, 9 typically found in media defamation cases.2"

ments and they have been covered at length by newspapers from Boston to
Dallas. ABC News' magazine show "Day One" devoted an entire segment to
the content of these documents.
Memorandum of Amici Curiae on Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 11,
Regents of Univ. of Cal. (No. 967298).
17. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Special Motion to Strike Complaint at 1, Regents of Univ. of Cal. (No. 967298). SLAPP is an
acronym for Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation. Robert D. Richards, Suing to Squelch" A New Way to Keep Activists Quiet, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 1992, at
C1. Two University of Denver professors created the term less than a decade ago.
Penelope Canan & George W. Pring, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation,
35 Soc. PROBs. 506 (1988).
18. The Restatement of Torts defines libel as "the publication of defamatory matter
by written or printed words, by its embodiment in physical form or by any other
form of communication that has the potentiAlly harmful qualities characteristic of
written or printed words." REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 568 (1977). Libel typically involves the written, pictorial, or broadcast form of defamation. Robert D. Sack,
Common Law Libel and the Press: A Primer, in COMMUNICATIONS LAw 35, 123-24
(1993). But see CAL Civ. CODE § 46 (West 1994) (providing that slander includes
defamation by "radio or any mechanical or other means").
19. The four basic privacy torts, as originally categorized in an influential law jour-.
nal article by tort scholar William L Prosser, are intrusion into seclusion, false light,
public disclosure of private facts, and appropriation. William L Prosser, Privacy, 48
CAL L REv. 383, 389 (1960). The privacy torts are distinct from the federal constitu..
tional right to privacy recognized by the United States Supreme Court. Cf Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (finding an unenumerated constitutional right
to privacy in the penumbras of a number of specific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights).
20. It may be somewhat misleading today to describe a typical cause of actiorn
against a media defendant. Plaintiffs' attorneys now assert numerous causes of action
to avoid, or to make an end-rim around, the high wall of constitutional protection

that now protects media defendants in libel actions. As David Kohler, deputy general
counsel for Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., observed, "today, in addition to the
more common claims of defamation and invasion of privacy that have relatively welldeveloped First Amendment limitations, we increasingly see suits alleging trespass,
breach of contract, infliction of emotional distress, unfair trade practices and even

racketeering." David Kohler, Blame the Laws, Mr. Wallace, Not the Lawyers, WAL ST.
J., Nov. 21, 1995, at A16. See generally Baugh v. CBS, 828 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Cal.
1993) (addressing complaint for nontraditional causes of action related to a media
defendant's behavior such as intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent
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The case raises, however, a wide range of issues with important First
Amendment implications. Questions stretch from the scope of academic
freedom under the First Amendment to the use of the graphics-rich
World Wide Web (Web) as a strategic litigation weapon to defeat discovery and evidentiary privileges and to influence the direction of lawsuits. Specifically, the First Amendment-related issues addressed in the
first part of this Article include:
(1) Application of heightened First Amendment scrutiny to generally
applicable state laws, including writs of possession
and conversion,"
2
that do not, on their face, regulate or target speech; 2
(2) Use of SLAPP suits to stifle public debate on issues such as the
dangers of smoking;' and
(3) Use of Internet and World Wide Web technologies to disseminate
allegedly stolen and privileged information in order to influence pending
litigation.'
This Article goes beyond analysis of the legal and public policy issues
in Broum & WiUiamson Tobacco Corp. v. Regents of University of
California.' It draws a stark contrast between the response of the
University of California, the cradle of the 1960s free speech movement
at its Berkeley campus, and the actions of two television networks,
ABC and CBS, in their recent battles against Big Tobacco.' While the
television networks caved under legal and economic pressures,' a ma-

infliction of emotional distress, fraud, trespass, and unlawful business practices).
21. Conversion, under California law, is a strict liability tort that "protects against
interference with possessory and ownership interests in personal property." Moore v.
Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 487 (Cal. 1990).
22. See infra Part I.B.I.
23. See iqfra Part I.B.2.
24. See infra Part 1.B.3.
25. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., No. 967298
(Cal. Super. Ct. S.F. County dismissed Feb. 7, 1996).
26. See Philip Morris Cos. v. ABC, 23 Media L Rep. (BNA) 2438 (Va. Cir. Ct.
1995) (discussing discovery dispute over confidential sources in defamation action
filed by Philip Morris against ABC that the network later settled out of court); Lawrence K Grossman, CBS, 60 Minutes, and the Unseen Interview, CoLUM. JOURNAUSM
REv., Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 39 (discussing CBS's decision not to run a 60 Minutes ex-

pose critical of the tobacco industry).
27. See generally Bill Carter, Dispute Erupts at '60 Minutes' Over Canceling of
Interview, N.Y. TIME, Nov. 18, 1995, at AlO (describing the controversy created in
November 1995, when the CBS television newsmagazine 60 Minutes pulled from its
schedule an interview with a whistle-blowing former employee of Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. for fear of legal liability); Steve Weinberg, Smoking Guns: ABC,

jor public university flexed its muscles, stood its ground, and ultimately

claimed victory against an extremely powerful player in the cigarette
M
industry."
Drawing from communication research on media ownership and

influences, as well as from a growing body of literature on pedagogy
and service learning, this Article questions whether, in an era of increasing consolidation, concentration, amd cross-pollination of media
ownership,'M an era in which bottom-line dollars matter most, the pub-

lic will be left to rely on universities rather than traditional news media
for information about important matters of public concern.' Research
universities are established centers for the discovery and advancement
of knowledge and, increasingly, hubs for public service and service
learning. Without the publicity provided by major media outlets, however, knowledge is destined to remain closeted in obscure and often inaccessible academic journals.
Part I of this Article, drawing from pleadings, points and authorities,
and court transcripts, analyzes Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v.
Regents of University of California."'It describes the facts of the case
and its First Amendment-related issues, arguments, and conclusions.
Part II contrasts the tack of the University of California in its battle
against Brown & Williamson with that of ABC against cigarette giant
Philip Morris Co., Inc.' and CBS against Brown & Williamson.' It

Philip Morris and the Infamous Apology, COLubt. JOURNALISM REV., Nov.-Dec. 1995, at
29-37 (providing a review of the events and circumstances surrounding ABC's 1995
capitulation to Philip Morris in a defamation action brought by the cigarette manufacturer against the network for two Day One broadcasts about the processes of nicotine manipulation and reconstitution).
28. After Brown & Williamson lost at the superior court level, the California Supreme Court denied its application for stay of that order and its petition for review.
Dave Thorn, Tobacco Company Loses Bid to Suppress Damaging Documents, REcORDER (S.F.), June 30, 1995, at 4. In early 1996, pursuant to a joint stipulation and request by both parties, Judge Stuart R. Pollak of San Francisco County Superior Court
ordered the case dismissed without prejudice. Joint Stipulation and Request for Dismissal and Order of Dismissal at 3, Regents of Univ. of CaL (No. 967298). The dismissal order states, however, that Brown & Williamson is not waiving any attorneyclient or work product privileges that may apply to the same documents in other
cases. Id
29. See generally BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY (4th ed. 1992)
(providing a detailed analysis of the growing concentration of ownership of media
operations); Bill Carter, In a Far-R~ung Empire, Some Winners Some Losers and
Works in Progress: Fox TV Raises Concern, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1996, at D9 (providing a breakdown of the current assets and wealth of mega-media businesses including
Walt Disney Co., Time Warner, Viacom, and News Corporation).
30. See irfra notes 309-94 and accompanying text.
31. See itra Part I.A.-B.
32. Philip Morris, the nation's largest cigarette and tobacco products company, con-
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analyzes the growing trend of media conglomeration and the self-censorship dangers it poses for investigative journalism.
Part H1also suggests, somewhat ominously perhaps, that the public
may be forced to rely on university-sponsored journalism projects and
university news services, not on traditional broadcast media outlets
such as television news organizations, for the investigation and dissemination of information about some controversial matters of public concern. This action-service role for the professors and students housed in
journalism and communication departments provides a natural bridge
across a holy trinity of university goals of teaching, research, and service, while allowing universities to fulfill their mission of public service
to local communities and the nation.' Bottom-line economic pressures
on mega-media corporations are becoming too great to place blanket
trust in traditional news organizations for all the news that is fit to
print.' Alternatives must be found.
Part I concludes that Regents of University of California was a
major victory for academic and intellectual freedom and for plaintiffs
involved in litigation against the tobacco industry.' A growing cowardice in the face of legal liability, however, mitigates its importance for
the press.' In brief, even if the press could legally disseminate material like that in Regents of University of California, the question still

trolled 44.896 of the United States' cigarette market in 1994. Still Smokin', supra note
3, at 61-62.
33. See infra Part Il
34. For an excellent analysis of whether community and public service actually enhances a university's academic mission or whether these are simply misplaced efforts
to help heal sagging social conscience, see Jeremy Cohen, Matching University Mission With Service Motivation: Do the Accomplishments of Community Service Match
the Claims?, 1 Mica J. CormuNnrY SERVICE LFARNiNG 98 (1994).
35. Sociologist Todd Gitlin, observing the negative effects of concentration and
conglomeration in the newspaper industry, stated that "[c]hains, especially those that
trade on the stock market, are more eager than single-paper proprietors to raise profit margins. They tend to cut costs by firing reporters and editors. As the number of
newspapers in a chain goes up, the size of the newshole tends to shrink" Todd
Gitlin, Not So Fast, MEDIA STUD. J., Spring-Summer 1996, at 1, 4-5. Gitlin stated that
the potential for harm from the growing concentration of ownership "is at least as
impressive as the potential for good." Id. at 6.
36. See infra notes 395-96 and accompanying text.
37. Stanford University law professor Robert Rabin observed that the availability of
the Brown & Williamson documents provides plaintiffs' attorneys with powerful new
evidence to show juries and could "change the landscape" of products liability litigation against cigarette manufacturers. Harriet Chiang, Suit Says Tobacco Firms Lied,
S.F. CHRON., July 26, 1996, at A21.

arises whether it nonetheless would refrain from publishing the material for fear of a potential defamation action. A new role for universities in filling the information void left by broadcast news media must
therefore be considered.
I. BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO CORP. V. REGENTS OF
UNIESrITY OF CALIFORNLA

A.

FactualBackground

Brown & Williamson's legal woes against UCSF began with the actions of a disgruntled paralegal, Merrll Williams.' Williams worked
for the law firm Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs in Louisville, Kentucky, from
1988 through part of 1992.' The firm was outside counsel for Brown &
Williamson in product liability lawsuits filed against the cigarette manufacturer.'

During his time at Wyatt, Williams worked on confidential litigationrelated document production and review for Brown & Williamson.' He
has described this work as "not just protecting, but perpetuating some
kind of method of dealing with, if not murder, certainly a kind of deviousness that would cause people great damage."' Williams and other

paralegals reviewing documents, however, signed agreements not to
disclose what they learned.'

38. Defamation is the general term that includes both the libel and slander torts.
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToRm § 111, at 771 (5th
ed. 1984).
39. See Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Application for
Writ of Possession at 2, Regents of Univ. of Cal. (No. 967298) (stating that "an expert examiner of documents formerly with the [Federal Bureau of Investigation] ...
determined that the [diocuments [sent to Glantz] originated from the original copies
made by (Merrell] Williams").
40. Kisliuk, supra note 1, at 2. Prior to working as a paralegal, Williams, who
holds a Ph.D. from the University of Mississippi, was a professor of drama. PHam J.
HiLTs, SMOKESCREEN: THE TnuTH BEHIND THE ToBAcco INDuSTRY COVER-UP 130-31
(1996). Williams taught drama and writing on a part-time basis at Jackson State University in Mississippi. Id. at 131.
41. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Wlliams, 62 F.3d 408, 411 (D.C. Cir.
1995).
42. l& Williams's job was to analyze and classify documents selected by attorneys
for Brown & Williamson as significant in its defense in pending products liability litigation. Ex Parte Application and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support
of Ex Parte Application to Enforce Court Order and for a Protective Order Limiting
Discovery at 4 n.3, Regents of Univ. of Cal. (No. 967298). The firm trained Williams.
"concerning the issues in the tobacco product liability litigation, including B & W's
attorneys' legal theories, opinions, and conclusions regarding defense strategies." Id.
43. HiLTs, supra note 40, at 132.
44. Id, at 136.
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Before undergoing heart surgery and a quintuple bypass in 1993,'
Williams, a smoker of Brown & Williamson-manufactured Kool cigarettes for twenty-five years, "devoted more than four years to reading
the company's files" and became "concerned that he was helping hide a
conspiracy to defraud the public."' Williams decided, to copy documents because, as he stated, "I had to do something.... And because
otherwise there is no proof.... There just is no proof."47 Describing
the copying process, Williams said that he would go to work "at 5:30 in
the morning, or on Saturdays.... I would pick the times, or I would
hear of documents that sounded very interesting to me.... I would go
by the person's desk and eye it, get the number on the box, and come
back"'
About one year after leaving Wyatt,49 Williams told the firm "that he
had made copies of various [Brown & Williamson] documents to which
he had had access."'W As counsel for Brown & Williamson bluntly
wrote in papers filed in Regents of University of California,Williams
"photocopied and then stole thousands of B & W's privileged documents.""' Those documents would be at the heart of the dispute with
UCSF.
On May 12, 1994, Professor Stanton A. Glantz of the University of
California, San Francisco, received an unsolicited and anonymous box
of documents at his office.' The documents, according to Glantz, were

45. Id. at 130-32.
46. Krieger,.supra note 2, at 32.
47. HILTs, supm note 40, at 133.
48. Id. at 34.
49. According to documents filed in the cigarette manufacturer's suit against the
University of California, "Williams was laid off from his job as a paralegal for B &
W's outside law firm in 1992, with a two-week notice." Reply Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support of Application for Writ of Possession at 1, Regents of
Univ. of CaL (No. 967298).
50. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 411 (D.C. Cir.

1995).
51. Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Application for
Writ of Possession at 1-2, Regents of Univ. of Cal. (No. 967298).
52. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Application for Writ of
Possession and Preliminary Injunction at 4, Regents of Univ. of CaL (No. 967298). In
a new book by New York Times reporter Philip J. Hilts, Glantz along with others
such as David Kessler, Commissioner of the FDA, is described as one of the seven
heroes of the current anti-tobacco campaign. HINTs, supra note 40, at 52.

"an intellectual candy store."' He compared reading them to "reading
the real Hitler diaries."'
The documents, according to legal papers filed by the University of

California,
reveal that secret B & W and industry research demonstrated the health hazards
of cigarettes and the addictive properties of nicotine many years before they were
publicly known. They show that B & W and the rest of the industry misled the
public and health authorities about the health effects of smoking, about their own
research efforts, and that for years B & W publicly denied what its own internal
research was showing. They also show that B & W attorneys implemented a strategy to suppress these results by laundering potentially harmful information
through attorneys to enable them to assert privileges over them.6

Glantz made several sets of copies of the documents, placing one set
in the UCSF library's "Tobacco Control Archive" during the summer of
1994.' According to the University, "the documents were open to the
public and scholars for inspection, and were inspected and copied by a
number of persons."57 They attracted so much attention that the University created a waiting list for visitors.'
Brown & Williamson learned that UCSF had a copy of the documents
from briefs filed by plaintiffs' counsel in products liability litigation
against the company in other jurisdictions.' Representatives of the tobacco company completed a review of the documents at UCSF on February 1, 1995, and they allegedly determined that the papers were subject
to the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine."'
Although Glantz professed ignorance of the documents' sender, Brown
& Williamson linked them directly back to the departed paralegal, Williams. The tobacco company alleged that "the [d]ocuments traveled from
B&W's outside counsel to the library at UCSF by theft.""' As it later told

.53. Krieger, supra note 2, at 28.
54. Id.
55. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Application for Writ of
Possession and Preliminary Injunction at 4, Regents of Univ. of Cal. (No. 967298)

(citations omitted).
66. I& at 5. Glantz placed the documents in the Archive because of their "public
and academic importance." Id,
57. Id, at 6.
58. Krieger, supm note 2, at 32.
59. Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Application for
Writ of Possession at 4, Regents of Univ. of Cal. (No. 967298).
60. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Application for. (1) Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause Re Preliminary Injunction; (2) the
Appointment of a Receiver, and (3) an Order Requiring the Turnover of Library Records at 4, Regents of Univ. of Cal. (No. 967298).
61. Id. In ruling on Brown & Williamson's motion for a writ of possession and
turnover of the documents, San Francisco County Superior Court Judge Stuart R
Pollak assumed, for the sake of argument, that the documents "were removed from
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the superior court in Regents of University of California,"All that is at
issue in this case are documents and information stolen by a former
paralegal who was employed to defend B & W in pending litigation."'
On February 14, 1995, Brown & Williamson ified a complaint against
the University of California seeking immediate recovery of the cigarette
documents and alleging that it owned the documents at UCSFs library.' Brown & Williamson contended that the University's possession
of the allegedly privileged documents constituted conversion under California law.' The tobacco company also sought a temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction preventing the public and anyone other
than counsel for Brown & Williamson from gaining access to the documents in UCSF's library until resolution of its request for their return.6'
In addition, the tobacco company requested an order to require the University to turn over its library records in an effort to discover the identity
of all individuals who inspected the documents. '
Judge Stuart R. Pollak of the Superior Court of California, County of
San Francisco, immediately granted a temporary restraining order, which
required placement of the documents "in a secure locked vault, safe or
room where access is limited to counsel for the University and counsel
for Brown and Williamson," and remained in effect throughout the litigation of other issues. 7 Those issues, as well as other public policy questions suggested by the facts in Regents of University of California,are
addressed below.

the possession of Brown & Williamson's attorneys by Mr. Williams, and those documents, removed without authority by Mr. Williams, are the source of the documents
which found their way into the hands of the University." Court Transcript of May 25,
1995 Hearing at 7, Regents of Univ. of CaL (No. 967298).
62. Ex Parte Application and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Ex Parte Application to Enforce Court Order and for a Protective Order Limiting
Discovery at 4, Regents of Univ. of CaL (No. 967298).
63. Complaint for Specific Recovery of Personal Property and Declaratory Relief,
Regents of Univ. of CaL (No. 967298).

64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at
Id. at
Id, at
Order

3.
4.
3-4.
to Show Cause and Temporary Restraining Order, Regents of Univ. of

CaL (No. 967298).

B. Issues and Arguments
This section concentrates on three legal and public policy issues raised
in Regents of University of California. Each carries important First
Amendment implications.
1. Applying First Amendment Scrutiny to Generally Applicable State
Laws that do not Regulate Speech
The return of the documents to Brown & Williamson pivoted on the
validity of its cause of action for conversion under California law. To
obtain a writ of possession' for the documents, the cigarette manufacturer first needed to establish the "probable validity" of its conversion
claim.,
The basic elements of conversion are (1) the plaintiffs right to possess
the property in question at the time of the alleged conversion, (2) a
wrongful act or disposition of the property by the defendant, and (3)
damages. F° Under California law, "[tihe gravamen of the tort of conversion is the deprivation of the possession or use of one's property."7 To
constitute deprivation, actual interference with the property must be
substantial.'
Invoking the common conversion remedy of "[s]pecific recovery of the
property, with damages for its detention,"' Brown & Williamson sought
the return of its documents from UCSF and all other copies that UCSF
had made of the set Glantz received.
a.

Brown & Williamson's argument: The FirstAmendment is
irrelevant

The conversion tort, on its face, does not regulate or restrict speech.
Unlike the libel and slander torts that directly target speech, conversion
applies to conduct, such as wrongful possession and use of another's
personal property (a jacket or car, for example) that is often unrelated to
the expression of any message.

68. See CAL CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 512.010-120 (West 1979 & Supp. 1996) (describing
California rules governing writs of possession).
69. See id. § 512.060 (providing that a judge may issue a writ of possession after
a hearing if "{t]he plaintiff has established the probable validity of his claim to possession of the property" and has "provided an undertaking").
70. Hartford Fin. Corp. v. Burns, 158 Cal. Rptr. 169, 172 (Ct. App. 1979).
71. FMC Corp. v. Capital Cities/ABC, 915 F.2d 300, 304 (7th Cir. 1990) (emphasis

in original) (citations omitted).
72. 5 B.E. WMuN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Torts § 610 (9th ed. 1988).
73. Id. § 611.
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Brown & Williamson thus argued that the case did not warrant First
Amendment scrutiny which might protect UCSFs publication and dissemination of the documents.7' The court could, according to the company, decide the dispute simply by considering the three conversion elements; no balancing or weighing of free speech concerns was necessary.
As the tobacco proprietor put it:
This case simply does not involve any state law that regulates speech within the
meaning of the First Amendment, let alone a law that imposes prior restraints on
speech based on content. B & W's state law claim does not depend upon proof
that the University has engaged in tortious speech or even tortious dissemination
of its documents. The gravamen of B & W's claim under California law is simply
that the University has possession of its documents and has declined to return
them.T
i.

Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.78

Brown & Williamson relied on the United States Supreme Court's 1991
holding in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. to support its argument that First
Amendment scrutiny does not apply to generally applicable state laws
that do not target speech.' In Cohen, the Supreme Court held by a narrow five-to-four margin that First Amendment scrutiny does not apply to,
or bar, a state law promissory estoppel claim for breach of a reporter's
promise of source confidentiality.m Justice White, writing for the Cohen
majority, concluded that the case was governed by a "well-established
line of decisions holding that generally applicable laws do not offend the
First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has
incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news. " 7'
The theory of relief before the Supreme Court in Cohen was promissory estoppel, which "allows courts to enforce a promise, even though
there is no legally binding contract, in order to avoid injustice." ° Justice
74. Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Application for
Writ of Possession at 15-23, Regents of Univ. of Cat (No. 967298).
75. Id. at 15.
76. 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
77. Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Application for
Writ of Possession 20-21, Regents of Univ. of Cal. (No. 967298).
78. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 665. Promissory estoppel "is an old Anglo-American legal
rule that was promulgated to prevent injustice when someone fails to keep a promise
that he or she has made, a promise that by itself does not add up to an enforceable
contract, but a promise someone else has relied on." DON R. PEMBER, MASS MEDIA

LAW 323 (1996).
79. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 665.
80. Barbara W. Wall & John P. Borger, Broken Promises in the Aftermath of Co-

White wrote that "enforcement of such general laws against the press is
not subject to stricter scrutiny than would be applied to enforcement
against other persons or organizations. " " The majority held that "the
First Amendment does not confer on the press a constitutional right to
disregard promises that would otherwise be enforced under state law."'
The defining precedent from Cohen, libel experts Robert D. Sack and
Sandra S. Baron wrote, is that "[tihe First Amendment does not override
ordinary tort or breach-of-contract principles imposed on a news-gatherer."as
Brown & Williamson argued that Cohen controlled against UCSF and
"foreclose[d] the University's claim of First Amendment protection."'
The company claimed that, like the law of promissory estoppel, "[tihere
can be no dispute that the legal remedy sought, a writ of possession
issued in furtherance of the law of conversion and privilege, does not in
any way target or sanction expressive conduct."' Any effect on speech,
Brown & Williamson asserted, was collateral. It stated:
The California law at issue in no way penalizes or sanctions the University based
upon the content of the messages it seeks to disseminate. The state law affords a
remedy without regard to the University's views about smoking and health....
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held... that such collateral
effects on speech do not give rise to First Amendment rights and do not require
constitutional scrutiny.'

Brown & Williamson's Cohen argument; is not without merit. In fact, it
has intimidated media attorneys in other disputes with the tobacco industry. Most notably, the recent fight between CBS and Brown & Williamson mentioned in the introduction' involved a threatened cause of
action for tortious interference with contractual relations against the
Tiffany network."M That theory, like promissory estoppel, does not target

hen, 13 CoMM. LAw., Spring 1995, at 1, 17.
81. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 670.
82. Id. at 672.

83. ROBERT D. SACK & SANDRA S. BARON, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS
701 (2d ed. 1994).
84. Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Application for
Writ of Possession at 20, Regents of Univ. of Cal. (No. 967298).
85. Id at 19.
86. Id at 20.
87. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
88. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979) (stating the criteria for a
cause of action for intentional interference with the performance of a contract by a
third party). The basic elements for a cause of action for intentional interference
with contractual relations are "(1) a valid contract between plaintiff and a third party; (2) defendant's knowledge of this contract; (3) defendant's intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; (4) actual
breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; and (5) resulting damage." Savage
v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 305, 314 (Ct App. 1993). The interfer-
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speech. Rather, the gist of tortious interference is "found in the common
law tort principle that one who intentionally induces another to break a
valid contract is, unless such conduct is privileged, liable for damages
legally caused thereby."'0
The CBS/Brown & Williamson dispute centered on whether the
network's actions in getting a former employee of the cigarette company
to "tell all" about the tobacco industry on an episode of 60 Minutes interfered with Brown & Williamson's nondisclosure contract with the exemployee.' The contract forbade Jeffrey Wigand from discussing his
employment at Brown & Williamson."'
CBS's conduct created the appearance that it induced Wigand to
breach. the nondisclosure agreement Specifically, the network agreed to
indemnify him against any defamation action that might result from his
statements on the show.' It also had paid the whistle-blowing former
employee $12,000 as a consultant for previous work on 60 Minutes episodes.' Additionally, the network gave Wigand veto power over the story before it was to air.' The agreement between CBS and Wigand created the impression of a quid pro quo agreement under which he would
talk, but only in return for cash, indemnification, and editorial control
over the episode.

ence may be by "either unlawful means or by means otherwise lawful when there is
a lack of sufficient justification," but a defendant may raise the affirmative defense of
justification. Herron v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 363 P.2d 310, 312 (Cal. 1961). See
generally Sandra S. Baron et al., Tortios Inteference: A PracticalPrimer For Media
Practitioners,in 2 LITIGATING LIBEL AND PRIVACY SuTS 483 (1996) (providing an overview of the tort of intentional interference with contractual relations and its applicability to journalistic newsgathering practices).
89. FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF ToRTs § 6.5, at 303 (2d ed. 1986).
90. Carter, supra note 27, at A10.
91. Id.
92. Freedman et al., supra note 3, at Al.
93. Id.
94. Id.

CBS executives, after meeting with their attorneys, decided not to run
the sizzling expos6 on the tobacco industry.' 5 They apparently feared
liability for intentional interference with the confidentiality agreement.5
Analyzing CBS's decision to spike the story, media defense attorney
David Kohler observed that Cohen put the network on shaky legal
ground.' He noted that under Cohen, "the First Amendment does not
shield the media from general laws not particularly aimed at speech. '
A First Amendment defense, therefore, may have proved unsuccessful."
Likewise, media attorney Cameron DeVore observed that Cohen was
powerful precedent in CBS's decision to cave to Brown & Williamson."° CBS retained DeVore as outside counsel to evaluate potential legal liability for the Wigand interview."' In response to sharp criticism of the network's decision to kill the episode,i" DeVore fired back
in a letter to The New York Times:
The legal issue here involves whether a tort, here interference with a contractual
relationship, is trumped by the First Amendment. The only time that happened in
any significant way since 1964, when the Supreme Court constitutionalized the
law of defamation in New York Times v. Sullivan, was in 1988 in FalweU v. Hustler, dealing with the closely related law of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

95. Elizabeth Jensen, CBS's Lund Says '60 Minutes' Decision Wasn't Linked to
Westinghouse Deal, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 1995, at B16. CBS eventually broadcast a
similar version of the original, unaired 60 Minutes episode featuring the Jeffrey
Wigand interview in February 1996, but only after The Wall Street Journal had aready reported the substantially same inforrmation. See Frank Rich, Smoking Guns at
'60 Minutes,' N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 3, 1996, at A23. CBS's decision to run the broadcast
some three months after it originally killed the piece was "only half-heroic." Id. "It
was precipitated not by newfound courage from CBS's lawyers, but by The Walt
Street Journal," which had already "obtained and published its own account of Mr.
Wigand's allegations, thereby reducing CBS's risk of a lawsuit from Brown & Williamson, Mr. Wigand's former employer." Id,
96. Grossman, supra note 26, at 44-45.
97. Kohler, supra note 20, at A16; see also William Bennett Turner, News Media
Liability for 'Tortious Interference" withia Source's Nondisclosure Contract, COMM.
LAw., Spring 1996, at 13, 14 (providing an excellent overview of media liability for
interference with nondisclosure contracts in light of dispute between Brown & Williamson and CBS, and observing that the "case overlooked by the lawyers so quick
to criticize CBS's killing of the Wigand interview is Cohen v. Cowles Media, Inc.
Isic]").
98. Kohler, supra note 20, at A16.
99. Id.
100. P. Cameron DeVore, In CBS Tobacco Case, Contract Came Before First
Amendment, N.Y. T0MES, Nov. 17, 1995, at B2.
101. Grossman, supra note 26, at 44.
102. E.g., SeVf-Censorship at CBS, N.Y. "ImEs, Nov. 12, 1995, at E14 (opining that
"media companies in play lose their journalistic aggressiveness when they let lawyers
and corporate executives make decisions that ought to be the province of news executives").
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rm sure that the "many legal scholars" you contacted must have told you that
while the Supreme Court has continued its strong protection for reputational
torts, it has not recently provided any First Amendment protection for news
gathering
The most recent example was Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. (1991) ....
Although some media attorneys disagree with the analyses of Kohler

and DeVore,0 4 it is clear that the overarching principle from Cohen-generally applicable state tort laws that do not target speech are
not subject to First Amendment scrutiny-provided solid ground for
Brown & Williamson's argument against UCSF. Without application of

First Amendment scrutiny or balancing of free speech interests, the road
to recovery would be much smoother for Brown & Williamson. They
would then only need to focus on the basic elements of conversion and
the statutory rules for writs of possession.
This is not to say, however, that satisfying the elements of conversion
would be easy for Brown & Williamson. It faced several high hurdles. In
particular, UCSF did not possess originals of the documents; it only had
copies." Also, UCSF did not unlawfully obtain those copies; rather, it
was merely a fortunate recipient. °6 Brown & Williamson needed to
show an ownership or possessory interest in the copies to recover under
a conversion theory. 7
Brown & Williamson argued that the attorney-client privilege" and
work product doctrine" created a property right in the information
contained in these copies. 10 It claimed that under California law, these

103. DeVore, supra note 100, at B2.
104. See James C. Goodale, CBS Must Clear the Air, N.Y. TH[Mt,Dec. 6, 1995, at
A23 (arguing that "no news organization has ever been sued for what it published
solely on a claim of inducing breach of contract"); Rex S. Heinke & lincoln D.
Barlow, Did CBS Choke?: Network May Have Had Little Reason to Fear a Tobacco
Company Lawsuit, S.F. DAILY J., Jan. 11, 1996, at 4 (stating that "it is unlikely the
media can be successfully sued for inducing breach of a confidentiality agreement").
105. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
107. A plaintiff "who has neither title nor possession, nor any right to possession,
cannot sue for conversion." WrimN, supra note 78, Torts § 617, at 715.
108. See CAL Evil.

CODE §§ 950-962 (West 1995) (setting forth the relevant statuto-

ry provisions governing attorney-client privilege).
109. See id.§ 2018 (West Supp. 1996) (providing California statutory authority governing attorneys' work product protection).
110. Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Application for
Writ of Possession at 11, Regents of Univ. of Cal. (No. 967298). Brown & Williamson
alleged that the court "should treat attorney client and attorney work product infor-

litigation and evidentiary privileges created a property interest in aU of
the copies of the documents.' A complete analysis of whether these
privileges create property interests in copies of documents is beyond the
scope of this Article. Instead, this Article focuses on a more fundamental
question: Does the First Amendment play a role in the judicial analysis of
a conversion cause of action?
b.

The University's argument: Ifbrmation suppression,not
conversion

Like a law professor craftily toying with students' minds in a Socratic
lecture, UCSF craftily began its attack against Brown & Williamson's
Cohen-based argument by recasting the legal issue. The issue was not,
according to UCSF, the return of stolen property under generally applicable conversion and writ of possession laws. Instead, the question was
whether Brown & Williamson had a legal right to restrict the free flow of
information on a topic of public importance."' The issue, simply put,
was not one of property but one of information."'
Diverting focus from the conversion issue, the University argued that
Brown & Williamson "want[ed] not only to obtain the set of documents
in the [UCSF] Library, but [also] to prevent forever the University from
possessing or distributing to the public and scholars any copy of those
documents, wherever obtained.""' "B & W can cite no case in which
such relief has been granted.""' By shifting the issue to the free flow of
information, UCSF could hoist the First Amendment free speech banner
in its defense. The case could not be decided without consideration of
First Amendment concerns for academic freedom and free, unfettered
debate on issues of public concern.
As Christopher Patti, in-house counsel for UCSF,"6 told Judge Stuart
Pollak during the pivotal hearing in the case, "[T]hese documents axe

mation as a form of valuable intangible property subject to conversion, for which the
appropriate remedy is the return of the documents and all copies to their rightul
owner." Id. The tobacco company relied primarily on Conn v. Superior Court, 242
CaL Rptr. 157 (C. App. 1987), for support of this argument. Reply Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of Application for Writ of Possession at 11, Regents
of Univ. of CaL (No. 967298).
111. Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Application for
Writ of Possession at 11, Regents of Univ. of CaL (No. 967298).
112. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Application for Writ of
Possession and Preliminary Injunction at 8, Regents of Univ. of Cal. (No. 967298).
113. Id, at 9.
114. Id, at 8-9.

115. Id. at 9.
116. For a brief proffle of the then-37-year-old Christopher Patti, see Science Major,
CAL LAw., Mar. 1996, at 34.
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extremely important to inform the public debate on this issue, and they
have academic importance and they are things that the public and the
government, and many people are very, very interested in.... This is a
newsworthy, extremely publicly important issue."" 7
Patti's argument about public debate on newsworthy issues evoked the
basis for the United States Supreme Court's seminal holding in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan."8 In Sullivan, the Court held for the first time
that First Amendment protections of free speech and press limit or restrict the reach of state defamation laws designed to compensate targets
of defamatory speech for reputational harm."' In reaching that conclusion, the Sullivan Court stressed "a profound national commitment to
the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open." 20

117. Court Transcript of May 25, 1995 Hearing at 40, Regents of Univ. of Cal. (No.
967298).
118. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
119. The Sullivan Court stated that "libel can claim no talismanic immunity from
constitutional limitations." Id. at 269. "It must be measured by standards that satisfy
the First Amendment." Id. The Court adopted the actual malice standard to protect
defendants from strict liability for false defamatory speech. Id. at 279-80. Under the
actual malice standard, a public official plaintiff must prove by convincing clarity that
the defendant either knew the speech at issue was false at the time it was communicated or acted with reckless disregard for whether it was false. Id. The actual malice
standard has since been extended to apply to cases involving public figure plaintiffs.
Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 162 (1967).
120. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270. The Supreme Court has held in other cases that
robust debate on public issues must be safeguarded. See generally New York Times
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 724 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring) (stating that
"[o]pen debate and discussion of public issues are vital to our national health").

Like the debate about segregation at the heart of Sullivan,"' the
controversy over the dangers of smoking and the practices of the tobacco industry are issues of profound public importance. Efforts by Brown
& Williamson to prevent the University from distributing information
about the tobacco industry's practices i-hibit the kind of robust, wideopen debate envisioned in Sullivan.
The University also likened Brown & Williamson's efforts to suppress
dissemination and distribution of the documents to the federal
government's attempt to suppress publication of the so-called Pentagon
Papers in New York Times Co. v. United States."2 In that case, the government sought an order restraining both The New York Times and The
Washington Post from publishing portions of a classified, forty-seven
volume government report on the history of United States involvement in
Vietnam."23 The government claimed the report contained information2
that might, if publicly exposed, jeopardize national security interests.'I
The United States Supreme Court rejected the government's contention
and its attempt to restrain the newspapers' right to publish the information."2 The government could not clear the heavy burden it faced in
seeking a presumptively unconstitutional remedy-a prior restraint on
speech. 26
The University argued that if the national security interests in New
York Times Co. v. United States were not sufficient to prevent distribution of the documents in that case, then any interests asserted by Brown
& Williamson did not warrant suppression of the documents in the UCSF
library.'27 The University contended that "the interests asserted by

121. The full-page advertisement that generated the libel action in Sullivan supported the actions of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., a leader of the civil rights movement,
and black students in the South engaged in nonviolent demonstrations against segregation and racism. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256-58. Libel suits brought by Southern officials, such as the one brought by LB. Sullivan, a city commissioner in Montgomery,
Alabama, against The New York Times, were designed to do more than provide plaintiffs with compensation for reputational harm. ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE No LAW: THE
SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 35-36 (1991). Their purpose was to chill
criticism of segregation and coverage of the growing civil rights movement in the
national press. Id. Southern officials hoped that rather than risk exposure to huge
plaintiff verdicts in libel suits stemming from articles critical of Southern officials, the
national press would choose instead to simply not cover the civil rights movement or
expose Southern atrocities. Id. Libel law became a state political weapon used "to
scare the national press--newspapers, magazines, the television networks-off the
civil rights story." Id. at 35.
122. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
123. Id. at 714.
124. Id. at 718-19 (Black, J., concurring).
125. Id. at 714.
126. Id.
127. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Application for Writ of
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B & W are nowhere close in gravity to those found insufficient in the
Pentagon Papers Case."28
The University did not stop its First Amendment line of defense with
arguments about unfettered debate on issues of public importance and
the dangers of prior restraints. Instead, it enveloped those arguments in
the academic context of the case." Citing United States Supreme
8
Court decisions in Sweezy v. New Hampshire"
and Keyishian v.
Board of Regents of New York,' the University argued that scholarly
inquiry and researcher access to the documents increased the First
Amendment concerns for protecting dissemination of the documents."
The University also cited a line of cases holding that when a reporter
lawfully obtains truthful information about an issue of public concern,
the First Amendment prohibits punishment for the distribution of that
speech absent an interest of the highest order." The University argued
that it lawfully obtained the documents, that those documents were
truthful, and that they involved a matter of public concern."
For all of the above reasons, the University asserted that, contrary to
Brown & Williamson's position, First Amendment concerns barred the
cigarette manufacturer's recovery of the documents.
c.

Superior court decision: Of witch hunts and escaped genies

Judge Pollak rejected Brown & Williamson's argument.'" The case
could not be decided without considering the First Amendment. He observed early in the crucial May 25, 1995, hearing on the request for a writ

Possession and Preliminary Injunction at 18, Regents of Univ. of Cal. (No. 967298).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 16.
130. 354 U.S. 234 (1957). Harvard constitutional law scholar Laurence Tribe observed that "[a]lthough the Supreme Court has not explicitly identified academic freedom as an independent first amendment doctrine, it has at least implicitly recognized
its importance." LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-4, at 813 n.32

(2d ed. 1988).
131. 385 U.S. 589 (1967). In Keyishian, the United States Supreme Court stated that
"[olur nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of
transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned." Id. at 603.
132. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Application for Writ of
Possession and Preliminary Injunction at 16, Regents of Univ. of CaL (No. 967298).
133. Court Transcript of May 25, 1995 Hearing at 42-43, Regents of Univ. of Cal.

(No. 967298) (citations omitted).
134. Id. at 40-41.
135. Id. at 50-52.

of possession that "there are First Amendment considerations that have
to be taken into account. " "3 He elaborated on those considerations
throughout the hearing.
Pollak initially observed that an academic institution like UCSF has
First Amendment interests that are "as great, if not greater" than those of
traditional media defendants like newspapers and television stations. 3'
Those First Amendment interests are tied to facilitating interchange of
ideas and information in a public dialogue." In a crucial exchange with
Barbara Caulfield, the Latham & Watkins attorney and former federal
judge who argued the case on behalf of Brown & Wiliamson," Judge
Pollak observed:
I think, in terms of the interests underlying the First Amendment, the interchange
of ideas, and so forth, this is an academic center.. [with] an interest in academic freedom, if not freedom of the press.
After all, what the result of what you are asking would be, to the extent it was
successful, to the extent it is doable at all, in view of where things stand at the
moment, would be to suppress information and to prevent information from being
used in a public dialogue in various ways. And it seems to me those are exactly
the First Amendment interests that we are concerned with. And, sure, the University isn't a newspaper, but its the same underlying concern, I think, that we have
to be dealing with."4

'Judge Pollak's statement is crucial for three reasons. First, it acknowledges a distinct, unenumerated First Amendment right of academic freedom. The text of the First Amendment is silent on the subject of academic freedom. 4 In a deep bow to the judicial activism of judges and
justices past, Judge Pollak nonetheless recognized an implied orfperipheral right of academic freedom lurking within the penumbra of the First
Amendment's Free Speech and Free Press Clauses.42
The recognition of implied rights in those clauses is not new. Indeed,
the United States Supreme Court recognized an implied right of academ-

136. Id.
137. Id. at 15.
138. lId at 15-16.
139. Kisliuk, supra note 1, at 2. Caulfield, a former federal judge in the Northern
District of California, is a partner in the San Francisco office of Latham & Watkins.
Id. On appeal Brown & Williamson was represented by Kevin J. Dunne of the San
Francisco law firm Sedgwick, Detert, Moran & Arnold. Stipulation Re Substitution of
Attorneys filed on Sept. 7, 1995 at 1, Regents of Univ. of Cal. (No. 967298).
140. Court Transcript of May 25, 1995 Hearing at 15-16, Regents of Univ. of Cal.
(No. 967298).
141. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
142. See Court Transcript of May 25, 1995 Hearing at 15-16, Regents of Univ. CaL
(No. 967298).
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ic freedom in dictum in Griswold v. Connecticut." Justice William 0.
Douglas, writing for the Court in Griswold, observed:
The right of freedom of speech and press includes not only the right to utter or
to print, but the right to distribute, the right to receive, the right to read and freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom to teach-indeed tikwem
of
the entire university community. Without those peripheral rights the specific
rights would be less secure.'"

Second, Judge Pollak suggested that the scope of the unenumerated
First Amendment right of academic freedom is extremely broad. It reaches beyond protecting professors' classroom decisions about what to
teach and how to teach-what Justice Douglas called the "freedom to
teach."" The right also encompasses more than the ability to generate
and produce new information and knowledge-what the Griswold Court
dubbed as "freedom of inquiry.""4
More inclusive than either the right to teach or the freedom of inquiry,
the First Amendment right of academic freedom articulated by Judge
Pollak includes the ability to distribute and disseminate the fruits of
academic inquiry.147 As quoted above, Judge Pollak observed that
Brown & Williamson's request was one "to suppress information.""4 In
brief, the scope of academic freedom must include not only information
generation (freedom of inquiry) but also information dissemination.49
This difference is more than semantic. It is crucial. Limiting the implied First Amendment right of academic freedom to information generation would not help UCSF; the University did not generate or produce
the cigarette documents."w It was, instead, a lucky recipient of a treasure chest of knowledge long submerged under a sea of alleged privileges and work product arguments. 5' Its job, as a public university, was
to make public that knowledge.
Finally, the importance of Judge Pollak's reasoning goes beyond recognition of a broad First Amendment right of academic freedom which
includes the freedom to disseminate information. He acknowledged the

143. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
144. Id, at 482-83 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
145. Id. at 482.
146. Id,
147. Court Transcript of May 25, 1995 Hearing at 15-16, Regents of Univ. of Cat.
(No. 967298).
148. Id.
149. Id,
150. Id, at 7, 16.
151. Id. at 13-15.

crucial importance of not just the process of dissemination, but the product of that dissemination. This product or "telos" is "public dialogue"'
that may "affect legislation, either state or federaL" "'
With that language Judge Pollak squarely embraced the vision and free
speech theory of philosopher-educator Alexander Meiklejohn.'
Meildejohn believed that "[t]he principle of the freedom of speech
In a
springs from the necessities of the program of self-government."
self-governing democracy, one in which the "[riulers and ruled are the
same individuals,"" wise decisions about public policy issues require
that "all facts and interests relevant... shall be fully and fairly present-

ed.157
Commentators frequently identify the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Sullivan with Meildejohn's version of democratic self-governance." In
fact, since First Amendment scholar Harry Kalven, Jr.'s 1964 article on
Sullivan linked the Court's reasoning to Meildejohn," legal scholars
have cited what free expression theorist Lee C. Bollinger calls an axiomatic "Meildejohn-SuUivan alliance. " " Former Supreme Court Justice
William Brennan, author of the Court's seminal Sullivan opinion, reinforced the link when he paid homage to Meildejohn in a Brown University lecture.'' Today, as University of Chicago constitutional law
scholar Cass R. Sunstein suggests, it is a "relatively uncontroversial
working hypothesis that the [Sullivan] decision rested on Professor
Meiklejohn's conception of the first amendment.""6
Judge Pollak's decision embraces the reasoning of the MeildejohnSullivan alliance. Without information contained in the Brown & Williamson documents, public debate on regulating cigarette advertising and
classifying nicotine as a drug would weaken. Dissemination of the Brown
& Williamson information promotes and facilitates wise and informed

152. Id. at 16.
153. Id. at 18.
154. See generaly ALEXANDER MEILnaOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTTUTIONAL
POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1960).

155. Id, at 27.
156. Id. at 12.
157. Id, at 26.
158. See LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERAN'

SOCIEY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EX-

TREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA 49-50 (1986).

159. Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning
of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191 (1964).
160. BOLLINGER, supra note 158, at 49.

161. William J. Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meikdohn Interpretation of
the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L REV. 1 (1965).
162. Cass R. Sunstein, Hard Defamation Cases, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 891, 898

(1984).
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decision making on cigarette and nicotine regulation, a topic that directly
impacts public health, safety, and welfare.
We may never know the exact impact the information contained in the
Brown & Williamson documents had on President Bill Clinton's recent
unveiling of new, stringent regulations targeting tobacco advertising."
It is not mere idle speculation, however, to think that the documents informed public dialogue, which in turn resulted in new federal legislation
announced on August 23, 1996.'" Indeed, David A. Kessler, FDA Commissioner and the person charged with carrying out the new regulations,
said publication of the Brown & Williamson documents "was a major
moment, beyond which all went in one direction.... It was the first time
we had anyone saying, 'We are in the business of selling nicotine, which
is an addictive drug.... . Before that, all was indirect evidence.""

Judge Pollak recognized the potential influence of the information on
public dialogue and government policy. He observed that "the nature of
what is being requested would in fact impinge upon public discussion,
public study of this information, which has a bearing on all kinds of
issues of public health, public law, documents which may be taken to
suggest the advisability of legislation in all kinds of areas.""6
With First Amendment interests squarely in mind, and a request for
equitable relief on the table, Judge Pollak reasoned that "inevitably what
is presented is a weighing process." " In that process he characterized
First Amendment concerns as "a very strong public interest in permitting... this information to remain available for use by the University or
by others who may obtain it from the University.""6
In direct contrast to UCSFIs First Amendment interests, Judge Pollak
belittled Brown & Williamson's goals. He observed that the cigarette

163. See Barr & Hamilton, supra note 6, at Al.
164. Id.
165. HiLTs, supra note 40, at 141. Kessler's comments reflect the sum and substance
of one particularly damning document in the Brown & Williamson cache. In
1963-long before the current crackdown on cigarettes began-Brown & Williamson's
general counsel, Addison Yeaman, wrote that "nicotine is addictive. We are, then, in

the business of selling nicotine, an addictive drug effective in the release of stress
mechanisma" GLANTZ r AL, supra note 2, at 58. The gist of this 33-year-old
statement, Stanton Glantz observed, "contrasts sharply with the tobacco industry's
recent public claims that nicotine only adds taste and flavor." Id. at 73.
166. Court Transcript of May 25, 1.995 Hearing at 58, Regents of Univ. of Cal. (No.

967298).
167. Id at 57.
168. Id. at 58.

producer's interests should be questioned, stating, "First of all, at most
their interest at this point, I think, is in avoiding potential liability of one
sort or another. I don't mean to say that is insignificant But, in and of
itself, when compared with the other competing interest, it may not be
as great"'
Judge Pollak was quick to observe that Brown & Williamson could
assert the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine in other
litigation. 7 ° Brown & Williamson could light its battle over the applicability of those privileges in other venues. The issue of admissibility of the
documents in products liability cases, however, was not before his
court. 7' The University was not seeking to admit the documents into
evidence in a case against Brown & Wiliamson. The UCSF dispute was
neither a products liability case nor one brought by an attorney general
to recover health care costs for injuries caused by tobacco products. It
was, instead, simply a case about publishing information.
Judge Pollak observed that his decision against Brown & Williamson
should not be construed as a waiver of evidentiary and litigation privileges in other cases. He stated that if the cigarette manufacturer's covert
agenda against the University was not recovery of documents but preserving the privileges for use in other fora, then "I suppose... [that
agenda] has been achieved.... I suppose that anybody's job in trying to
show that they voluntarily acquiesced in the disclosure, they're going to
have a hard time with that.""7 In other words, by fighting the good
fight against UCSF, Brown & Williamson had not waived whatever privileges might protect the documents in other cases.
Before denying Brown & Williamson's application for a writ of possession, Judge Pollak made a further observation about the danger of ruling
in favor of the cigarette company. Such a ruling, he observed, might lead
to "witch hunts" by Brown & Williamson to find anyone with copies of
the documents."r If Brown & Williamson prevailed against UCSF,

169. Id,
170. Id. at 61.
171. Id. at 51. Judge Polak state&
We are not dealing with the question of the admissibility of any of these
documents in to [sic] evidence during the course of a particular proceeding.
Any question that particular documents should not be received in evidence
because they are privileged, because the privilege has not been waived, are
for determination in another context, in another time.
Id.

172. Id. at 62; see also CAL. Evm. CODE § 912 (West 1995) (providing California
statutory authority for waiver by voluntary disclosure of the attorney-client privilege),
173. Court Transcript of May 25, 1995 Hearing at 60, Regents of Univ. of Cal. (No.

967298).
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the next step would be to attempt to pursue and trace all of the copies of the
documents that have gone from the University elsewhere, and have already been
presented with applications to depose faculty members, depose other people, to
find out which documents they have, when they get them, who they give them to.
And, really, the specter of putting that process in motion, I think is a quite disturbing
one. The word that comes to mind is "witch hunts." I don't know that is
74
fair.

Judge Pollak did not want to create a slippery slope of eroding First

Amendment protection. He held the line on the cigarette manufacturer's
efforts to track down every person who ever saw the documents. To
grant Brown & Williamson's writ of possession
would be setting in process some steps that I think would be very, very troublesome, and certainly would present a good many additional First Amendment concerns, intruding into the research of others, and what others have done, looked at
the information, who they gave them to, and tracing the whole thing through. A
very disturbing prospec t m

It was, as the judge put it, "simply too late, at this point [for Brown &
Williamson]. The genie is out of the bottle." 78
In addition to weighing interests, Judge Pollak grounded his decision
in precedent. He found applicable the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals'
decision in FMC Corp. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc." In that case, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting in minois, applied California
conversion law."8 The appellate court applied federal and Illinois law
regarding defendant ABC's First Amendment-related defenses."in
FMC involved an ABC World News Tonight broadcast about a vehicle
manufactured in part by FMC for the United States Army." During the
show, an ABC reporter identified four copies of documents as belonging
to FMC."8 ' FMC alleged the documents were missing from its files."
Like the UCSF scenario, neither party disputed that the defendant was
not responsible for the loss of FMC's documents." Unlike the UCSF

174. Id. at 59-60.
175. Id. at 60.
176. Id.
177. 915 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1990). Judge Polak called the case the "most on point."
Court Transcript of May 25, 1995 Hearing at 54, Regents of Univ. of CaL. (No.
967298).
178. FMC Corp., 915 F.2d at 302.
179. Id.
180. Id, at 301.

181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.

case, however, the plaintiff did not possess copies or originals of the
allegedly converted documents."s
FMC filed suit for conversion, seeking return of the documents and
damages for misappropriation of documents it claimed contained confidential business information." The trial court dismissed the conversion
claim, holding "that copies of documents could not be converted. " "
The appellate court then considered the issue of "whether ABC must
return copies of FMC's own documents to FMC if the only documents
ABC possesses are merely duplicates of the documents removed from
FMC's files.""8
The appellate court, although not engaging in extensive elaboration of
the free press and free speech principles at stake, took account of First
Amendment interests." It observed that the case involved balancing
"delicate First Amendment principles."'" The court initially concluded
that ABC must give copies of the documents to FMC."° In consideration of First Amendment interests, however, it also held that
ABC is free to retain copies of any of FMC's documents in its possession (and to
disseminate any information contained in them) in the name of the First Amendment Moreover, ABC is in no way being punished for the dissemination of FMC's
information. It is merely being required to make copies of documents it refuses to
return. 1"

In brief, ABC was able to keep the documents but was forced to make
copies to give to FMC." This remedy, of course, would be useless for
Brown & Williamson.
The cigarette manufacturer's goal against UCSF was not to get the
documents back for its own use. It was not as if they contained a secret
formula for making cigarettes without which the company would be
unable to keep people puffing. Also, it is highly doubtful that Brown &
Williamson feared that Stanton Glantz and the University would start to
produce UCSF-brand cigarettes.
Rather, Brown & Williamson's objective was to suppress information.
It wanted to keep the documents out of the University's hands, and, in
turn, keep them away from attorneys for the plaintiffs involved in products liability litigation against the company.

184. Id.

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id
Id. at 302.
Id. at 303.
Id.
Id. at 306.
Id. at 305.
Id.
See id,
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Allowing UCSF to keep copies of the documents and to disseminate
the information contained in them-as the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals allowed ABC to do with FMC-would not benefit Brown & Williamson. The information would still be public. Its public nature would
harm the company in products liability litigation and other lawsuits filed
by state attorneys general to recover health care costs.
Applying the reasoning in FMC, Judge Pollak concluded that allowing
UCSF to keep copies of the documents "simply is not a conversion. " "
He added that had the University done something wrong to obtain the
documents, his decision might have been different." He ruled in the
University's favor. 95
In summary, Judge Pollak concluded that the generally applicable state
laws of conversion and writ of possession could not escape First Amendment scrutiny." Moreover, in articulating the First Amendment interests at stake, he gave expansive meaning to an unenumerated right of
academic freedom.9 7 Academic freedom means more than the right to
teach and the right of inquiry." It also includes the ability to disseminate and distribute to the public knowledge gathered and produced at
public universities."
His reasoning reflects a strong concern for protecting the kind of uninhibited, robust, and wide-open public debate on important public issues
that the United States Supreme Court prized in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan and that Alexander Meildejohn found fundamental for a truly
self-governing democracy."° Regulation of cigarettes and the tobacco
industry is at the heart of political debate today."° The dangers and
prevalence of teenage smoking concern all.' Cigarettes and related tobacco products kill more than 400,000 American smokers and 53,000 non-

193. Court Transcript of May 25, 1995 Hearing at 55, Regents of Univ. of Cal. (No.

967298).
194.
thing
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
ENG.

Id at 55-56 ("But here there is no suggestion that the University has done anywrong.").
Id. at 56.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 15-16.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 154-62 and accompanying text.
See supra note 6 (describing new FDA regulations on tobacco advertising).
See generally David A. Kessler, Nicotine Addiction in Young People, 333 NEw
J. MED. 186 (1995) (providing FDA Commissioner's views and data on children

and tobacco).

smokers each year. 2n Judge Pollak's decision enhanced public debate
on such issues. Ultimately, he concluded that the First Amendment interests outweighed Brown & Williamson's interest in protecting itself from
liability in other litigation.'
2.

A New Breed of SLAPP Suit?

In a 1988 article in Social Problems, two University of Denver professors, Penelope Canan and George W. Pring, identified a growing body of
cases they termed "strategic lawsuits against public participation."2'
Like Dean William L Prosser's seminal classification of four privacy torts
in a 1960 law journal article,' Canan and Pring designated a new category of lawsuit known by the acronym "SLAPP," and the name stuck.
In their initial article, Canan and Pring defined SLAPPs as "attempts to
use civil tort action[s] to stifle political expression."' In a later article,
Pring observed that the "apparent goal of' SLAPPs is to stop citizens from
expressing their political rights or to punish them for having done so.
SLAPPs send a clear message: there is a 'price' for speaking out politically."206
Typical causes of action filed by so-called SLAPPers include "defamation, abuse of process, interference with economic advantage, or other
intentional harm. "2 The SLAPPer's goal, however, is not to prevail on
such theories. Instead, the purpose is "to overwhelm the defendant with
the inconvenience and expense of litigation.""' As one California appellate court recently noted, "SLAPP plaintiffs do not intend to win their
suits; rather they are filed solely for delay and distraction... and to

203. C. Everett Koop, Foreword to GLAN77 Er AL., supra note 2, at xvii.
204. Court Transcript of May 25, 1995 Hearing at 57-62, Regents of Univ. of Cal.
(No. 967298).
205. Canan & Pring, supra note 17, at 506.
206. Prosser, supra note 19, at 389.
207. Canan & Pring, supra note 17, at 506.
208. George Pring, SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 7
PACE ENVrL L Rav. 3, 5-6 (1989).
209. Penelope Canan et al., Political Claims, Legal Derailment, and the Context of
Disputes, 24 LAW & Soc'v REv. 923, 924 (1990); see also Wilcox v. Superior Court, 33
Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 449 (Ct. App. 1994) (stating that "favored causes of action in
SLAPP suits are defamation, various business torts such as interference with prospective economic advantage, nuisance and intentional infliction of emotional distress");
Joseph J. Brecher, The Public Interest and Intimidation Suits: A New Approach, 28
SANTA CLARA L REv. 105, 113 (1988) (stating that "[tihese intimidation suits take the
form of actions for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, intentional interference
with prospective economic advantage, libel, ,binder, conspiracy, or other intentional
torts").
210. James E. Grossberg & Dee Lord, California's Anti-SLAPP Statute, 13 CoMM.
LAw., Fall 1995, 3, 4.
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punish activists by imposing litigation costs on them for exercising their
constitutional right to speak and petition the government for redress of
grievances." 211 In brief, a SLAPP "is a meritless suit filed primarily to
chill the defendant's exercise of First Amendment rights." 212 Its purpose
213
is "not to vindicate a legally cognizable right of the plaintiff."

Individuals often find themselves SLAPP targets for "reporting violations of law, writing to government officials, attending public hearings,
testifying before government bodies, circulating petitions for signature,
lobbying for legislation, campaigning in initiative or referendum elections,
filing agency protests or appeals, being parties in law-reform lawsuits,
and engaging in peaceful boycotts and demonstrations."2 4 Although

individuals are commonly the victims of SLAPP suits, newspapers also
may be SLAPPed by groups outraged over coverage of their cause or
16
organization.

A growing number of states have adopted anti-SLAPP legislation to
combat this new wave of litigation.2"' For instance, California Code of
Civil Procedure Section 425.16(b) provides in relevant partA cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech under the United States or
California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a
special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim." 7

211. Dixon v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 687, 693 (Ct. App. 1994). The Petition Clause of the First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging ... the right of the people . . . to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
212. Wilcox, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 449 n.2.
213. Id. at 450.
214. Pring, supra note 208, at 5.
215. See Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46, 55
(Ct. App. 1995), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct 53 (1996) (holding that the San Francisco
Chronicle could use California's anti-SLAPP statutes in an action filed against it by
More University).
216. Grossberg & Lord, supra note 210, at 6 n.10 (noting that Delaware, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New York, Rhode Island, and Washington have also enacted
anti-SLAPP legislation).
217. CA. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b) (West Supp. 1996). See generally Grossberg &
Lord, supra note 210, at 3-7 (describing the California anti-SLAPP provision and the
questions and issues it raises). Two excellent resources available free on the World
Wide Web that provide additional information on the California anti-SLAPP statute are
the San Francisco-based The First Amendment Project (last modified Jan. 1996)
<http://www.well.com/user/fap> and the California Anti-SLAPP Project (last modified
Feb. 5, 1996) <http://www.sirius.coc/tcasp/intro.html>.

Speech protected under the statute includes "any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in
connection with an issue of public interest" and "any written or oral
statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive,, or judicial body, or any other
official proceeding authorized by law."218 A motion to strike should be
granted "unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established
that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim."" 9
The legislature adopted the statute in light of "a disturbing increase in
lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional
rights of freedom of speech and petition for redress of grievances."'
The University of California contended that the complaint filed by
Brown & Williamson was this type of lawsuit."l The University filed a
motion to strike the cigarette manufacturer's complaint pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.'
Judge Pollak ultimately dismissed the motion to strike because the
University was not a "person" within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP
statute.' The statute applies only to a "cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's
right of petition or free speech."'
Judge Pollak's ruling, however, was made prior to the decision in
Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co.' In Lafayette
Morehouse, a California appellate court held that the statute protected a
corporate entity-a newspaper.' 8 If Judge Pollak had confronted that
precedent, his decision might have been different. As it was, however, he
never reached the substantive merits of the SLAPP suit issue.
Judge Pollak's denial of the University's motion to strike therefore is
not an indication that the University's argument was frivolous. He also
observed during oral argument that the anti-SLAPP allegation was "[a]n
interesting issue, and I'm sure both sides could argue it." '2 Furthermore, Judge Pollak considered the SLAPP issue only after he announced

218. CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e).
219. Id. § 425.16(b).
220. Id. § 425.16(a).
221. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Special Motion to Strike Complaint at 1-2, Regents of Univ. of CaL (No. 967298).
222. See id.; CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b).
223. Court Transcript of May 25, 1995 Hearing at 63, Regents of Univ. of Cal. (No.

967298).
224.
225.
226.
227.

CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b) (emphasis added).
44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46 (Ct. App. 1995), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 53 (1996).
Id. at 55.
Court Transcript of May 25, 1995 Hearing at 63, Regents of Univ. of Cal. (No.

967298).
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that he would not issue the writ of possession for Brown & Williamson.
Perhaps the judge was simply throwing a bone to the beleaguered tobacco company at that stage in the proceedings.
In this context, the substantive merits of the University's argument that
Brown & Williamson's suit was nothing more than a SLAPP are worthy
of consideration. Was the complaint for a writ of possession based on a
conversion theory a SLAPP suit designed to suppress important information that would fuel informed public debate on regulating Big Tobacco?
Or was it a legitimate attempt to recover documents and to prevent a
waiver in other litigation cases of privileges that might protect them?
a.

The University's argument

The University began its motion to strike by explicating what it perceived to be the lawsuit's true purpose:
to prevent scholars and the public from obtaining access to information contained
in documents in a public library at the University of California. With good reason,

B&W believes that the documents are damaging to it because they show that the
company knew about the dangers of smoking for decades while it suppressed this
public health information and even denied it.'

The University argued that "[a]lthough touted as an action for recovery
of 'personal property,' what B & W is really seeking is to prevent the use
and dissemination of information. " ' Playing to the anti-SLAPP suitstatute's requirement that to be stricken a complaint must target speech
"in connection with a public issue, " 's the University alleged that
"[t]here can be little question that the health consequences of smoking,
and B & W's early knowledge of them, constitute a 'public issue.'"3 1 In
addition, the University argued that there cannot be "any question that
whether or not the public is allowed access to such information, and
whether or not it is accessible to scholars is a matter of First Amendment concern. " ' The University thus concluded that the Brown & Williamson complaint was "a classic instance" of a SLAPP suit.'u

228. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Special Motion to Strike Complaint at 1, Regents of Univ. of CaL (No. 967298).
229. Id. at 3.
230. CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b) (West Supp. 1996).
231. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Special Motion to Strike Complaint at 3-4, Regents of Univ. of CaL (No. 967298).
232. Id. at 4.
233. Id at 1.

b.

Brown & WiUiamson's argument

Brown & Williamson took a three-pronged approach to counter the
University's allegation.' First, it asserted that conversion was not a
typical SLAPP cause of action.' Citing a 1994 California appellate
court decision, Brown & Williamson argued that common SLAPP theories
are defamation, "interference with prospective economic advantage, nuisance and intentional infliction of emotional distress."' Its case was
nothing like what two California appellate courts recently called the
typical, paradigmatic SLAPP suits--ones that involve citizens, an environmental group, or a neighborhood association opposed to a real estate
development
in which the developer sues to chill opposition to its
237
plans.
Second, Brown & Williamson argued that it filed suit to redress a legally cognizable claim. 3 Its purpose was not to obtain an economic advantage over the University through expensive and protracted litigation.' Brown & Williamson maintained they had "worked diligently to
resolve this issue quickly so there is no economic advantage from the
filing of the suit itself, and B & W has not requested any damage in the
prayer for relief so no economic advantage is sought."' Brown & Williamson asserted that "[flreedom to speak about tobacco-related issues
has not and will not be restrained or chilled by the filing or resolution of
this lawsuit. The issue is return of property and prevention of wrongful
acquisition of privileged information.""'
Finally, in close relation to its second argument, Brown & Williamson
argued that its primary motivation was not to tie up the University's
resources for a long period of time. 2 It stressed that it had "a material
interest in having this court resolve the underlying conversion issue in an
expedited fashion. Until B & W recovers possession of its confidential
documents, it risks having the privileged information contained therein
243
disclosed to other adverse parties..

234.
Univ.
235.
236.

Opposition to Defendant's Special Motion to Strike Complaint at 2-4, Regents of
of CaL (No. 967298).
Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 2 (citing Wilcox v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 449 (Ct. App.

1994)).
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 3 n.2.
at 3.

at 5.
at 3.

243. Id at 3-4.

[Vol 24: 391, 1997]

Smoking Out Big Tobacco
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

c.

A closer look at the SLAPP arguments

Judge Pollak never reached the merits of the SLAPP issue. He dismissed the motion to strike on the now questionable, technical ground
that the University was not a "person" within the meaning of California's
anti-SLAPP provision.' This subsection analyzes the substantive merits
of the University's allegation that the case was a SLAPP suit.
i.

A "typical" SLAPP suit?

An analytical starting point is recognition that SLAPP suits are not
limited to environmental issues, despite Brown & Williamson's suggestion
to the contrary. Quoting the California appellate court decision Dixon v.
Superior Court," Brown & Williamson argued that "'[tihe typical
SLAPP suit involves citizens opposed to a particular real estate development.'"2 However, it disingenuously omitted the Dixon court's
footnote: "Although SLAPP suits involving environmental issues are common, they may involve other matters." 7
Likewise, Brown & Williamson quoted the California appellate court
decision in Wilcox v. Superior Court' for the proposition that "[tihe
paradigm SLAPP is a suit filed by a large land developer against environmental activists or a neighborhood association intended to chill the
defendants' continued political or legal opposition to the developers'
plans. "u What Brown & Williamson omitted from this citation was the
Wilcox court's statement that "SLAPPs, however, are by no means limited to environmental issues... nor are the defendants necessarily local
organizations with limited resources."' SLAPPs can arise in settings
other than environmental disputes.
For instance, a California court recently held that a libel action fied by
a university to stifle a newspaper's criticism of the school was a SLAPP
suit" ' Furthermore, the California anti-SLAPP statutory provision does
244. Court Transcript of May 25, 1995 Hearing at 63, Regents of Univ. of Cal. (No.

967298).
245. 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 687 (Ct. App. 1995).
246. Opposition to Defendant's Special Motion to Strike Complaint at 3 n.2, Regents
of Univ. of Cal. (No. 967298) (quoting Dixon, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 693).
247. Dixon, 36 Cal Rptr. 2d at 693 n.7 (emphasis added) (citing Wilcox v. Superior
Court, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446 (Ct. App. 1994)).
248. 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446 (Ct App. 1994).
249. Id,at 449.
250. Id.
251. Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46 (Ct. App.

not restrict SLAPPs to specific factual patterns. It states only that a
SLAPP suit may arise from a "cause of action against a person arising
from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in
connection with a public issue."2" As a result, the fact that the UCSF
dispute did not involve an environmental issue does not preclude it from
attaining SLAPP status.-u
Brown & Williamson's argument that conversion is not typical SLAPP
suit fodder is also somewhat hollow. The cigarette manufacturer cited
Wilcox for the proposition that "favored causes of action in SLAPP suits
are defamation, various business torts such as interference with prospective economic advantage, nuisance and intentional infliction of emotional
distress."' Conversion is not included on this laundry list. Its application in Regents of University of California,however, was clearly business related. The documents in question related to the research, development, and manufacturing processes of a powerful player in the cigarette
industry. Disclosure of the information in those documents was harmful
to Brown & Williamson's business in that it interfered with its business
interests. In fact, the documents may have led to increased regulation of
the tobacco industry.'s It is thus hard to fathom how a cause of action
for conversion, in the context of the UCSF dispute, is not a business tort.
The United States Supreme Court has held that a label given to a cause
of action must be distinguished from its actual operation and effect,
especially in cases involving First Amendment concerns.2"
There is nothing about either the factual underpinning of Regents of
University of California or the underlying cause of action in the case

1995), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 53 (1996).
252. CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b) (West Supp. 1996).
253. To some extent, however, one could argue that the dangers of secondhand
smoke in restaurant, working, and social environments poses a serious environmental
issue.
254. Wilcox, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 449. Of the 228 SLAPPs studied by the University
of Denver's Political Litigation Project as of 1989, 5396 involved causes of action for
defamation, 3296 for business torts, 2096 for so-called judicial torts such as abuse of
process and malicious prosecution, 1896 for conspiracy, 13% for constitutional civil
rights violations, and 32% for nuisance and other causes of action. Pring, supra note
208, at 9. The figures total more than 10096 because the cases typically involve multiple claims. Id. at 9 n.16.
255. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
256. See generaily New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (stating
.we are compelled by neither precedent nor policy to give any more weight to the
epithet 'libel' than we have to other 'mere labels' of state law"); Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697, 708 (1931) (providing that "in passing upon constitutional questions the
court has regard to substance and not to mere matters of form, and that, in accordance with familiar principles, the statute must be tested by its operation and effect").
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that disqualifies it from SLAPP suit status. 7 Standing alone, however,
this neither affirms nor denies the University's allegation that it was
SLAPPed.
ii.

Speech about a matter of public interest?

SLAPP suits, under California law, target speech about a public issue.' This includes "any written or oral statement or writing made in a
place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of
public interest."'
It strains belief to argue that the B & W documents are not about an
issue of public concern, given the annual death toll of more than 400,000
Americans from smoking.W The documents relate to regulation of nicotine, cigarettes, and other tobacco products and thus pertain to consumer protection and public health, safety, and welfare."i
If, as Stanton Glantz and company argue in The Cigarette Papers, the
documents reveal that Brown & Williamson and its parent company, BAT
Industries, "knew that tobacco was addictive and causes disease,"' it

257. See supra notes 245-56 and accompanying text.
258. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b) (West Supp. 1996) ("A cause of action
against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's
right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in
connection with a public issue shall be subject to a motion to strike .
").
259. Id. § 425.16(e). The code also provides that an act is in furtherance of a
person's right of petition or free speech when a statement is made "in connection
with an issue under consideration or review by legislative, executive, or judicial

body." Id.
260. The Smoke Begins to Clear: The News from the Batefield Isn't Good for Tobacco, S.F. EAmINER, Aug. 23, 1996, at A22. According to a recent study supported
by the National Cancer Institute, "[s]moling is a preventable cause of death, yet it
accounts for more than 434,000 deaths annually in the United States." Melody Powers
Noland et aL, Relationship of Personal Tobacco-Raising, Parental Smoking, and Otker Factors to Tobacco Use Among Adolescents Living in a Tobacco-Producing Region,
21 ADDIcTivE BEHAvs. 349, 349 (1996). in addition, nearly one third of "all human
cancer is believed [to be] caused by cigarette smoking." Id.
Data compiled by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services revealed
that "3,000 young people begin smoking daily, that 1,000 will die prematurely as a
result, and that the numbers are rising. Other data indicate that the average teenage
smoker begins at 14 and is a daily smoker by age 18." Colette Fraley, Legal Issues
Likely To Impede Clinton Plan on Teen Smoking, CONG. Q., Aug. 12, 1995, at 2446.
261. Of the 228 SLAPP cases reported on by Pring in 1989, six percent related to
consumer protection issues. Pring, supra note 208, at 9.
262. GLANTrz ET AL., supra note 2, at 12.

is hard to imagine how those documents might not influence public dialogue and legal questions about regulating tobacco. Judge Pollak, in fact,
observed "an overwhelming public interest in those documents."2'
Rather than launch a frontal attack on the public issue question and
argue that the documents did not involve speech about a matter of public concern, Brown & Williamson contended that it "in no way attempted
to chill the University's expression of its opposition to B & W and its
production of tobacco."2' It contended that UCSF's "[flreedom to
speak about tobacco-related issues has not and will not be restrained or
chilled by the filing or resolution of this lawsuit."'
This argument is sophisticated and accurate, as far as it goes. Even if
UCSF was forced to give back the documents, Glantz and his colleagues
still could rail against the tobacco industry. Their voices in the escalating
dialogue about perceived evils of cigarettes and snuff could not be silenced by the return of sheets of paper-that much is true.
Brown & Williamson's argument omits, however, the fact that the quality of public dialogue would be hindered by the return of the papers.
Information would be excluded (assuming all copies were returned) from
the public's reach. The exclusion would deprive ordinary citizens concerned about dangers of smoking and tobacco industry antics, individuals
seeking to join the dialogue, of vital information. The documents contain
the kind of information that Alexander Meiklejohn might have described
as vital to "the voting of wise decisions."2" Voters, Meiklejohn counseled, "must be made as wise as possible." 7 An under-informed or uninformed dialogue raises serious First Amendment policy concerns.'
The United States Supreme Court acknowledged this argument in First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti."9 It reasoned that "the First
Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the self-expression
of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of informa-

263. Court Transcript of May 25, 1995 Hearing at 25, Regents of Univ. of Cal. (No.

967298).
264.
Univ.
265.
266.

Opposition to Defendant's Special Motion to Strike Complaint at 5, Regents of
of Cal. (No. 967298).
Id,
MFIimJoHN, supra note 154, at 26.

267. Id
268. For a thoughtful argument that quality public debate should be the defining
force and goal in determining the extent of government intervention and regulation in
the marketplace of ideas, see Owen M. FIss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71
IOWA L REv. 1405, 1417 (1986).
269. 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (holding that corporations have a First Amendment right to
make expenditures for the purpose of influencing a vote because it furthers the societal interest in the free flow of commercial information).
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tion from which members of the public may draw."270 This argument reflects a positive conception of First Amendment freedoms. The First
Amendment provides a positive freedom for informational access and
receipt of information. Its guarantees are not limited to a negative freedom, a freedom from government censorship.
For instance, the Supreme Court observed in Griswold v. Connecticut
that the First Amendment's "freedom of speech and press includes not
only the right to utter or to print, but.., the right to receive.""7 Without such a peripheral right, the Court observed, "the specific rights [in
the First Amendment) would be less secure. "
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, a case involving access to
courtrooms, Chief Justice Warren Burger observed that "[flree speech
carries with it some freedom to listen."' Justice William Brennan, concurring in Richmond, emphasized the First Amendment "assumption that
valuable public debate-as well as other civic behavior-must be informed."' 4
What Brown & Williamson sought was an order that, in the words of
the Bellotti Court, would limit "the stock of information from which
members of the public may draw."27 The company wanted to keep information out of public reach. Without public access to the information,
however, debate about regulations on tobacco products would be less informed, less honest, and more speculative. Debate about issues of public
concern must be more than "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,"' 7 it
must be informed.2
Thus, the tobacco company's argument that speech would not be
chilled by a court order for the return of the documents misses the
mark. Public debate would be limited. Although people could still speak,
speculation, hearsay, and rumors would replace reasoned argument.

270. Id. at 783.
271. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (holding a Connecticut statute forbidding the use of a contraceptive as violative of the right to privacy inferred
in the Constitution).
272. Id. at 482-83.
273. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980).
274. Id. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring).
275. First Nat'? Bank, 435 U.S. at 783.
276. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
277. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring).

iii.

The "typical" target?

The Brown & Williamson lawsuit protected the business interests of
the plaintiff. It targeted speech about issues of public concern. It affected
debate about those issues. Thus, the Brown & Williamson lawsuit had a
number of SLAPP-like characteristics.
The target of the lawsuit, however, was atypical of a SLAPP suit. The
University of California is a major public university replete with its own
in-house attorneys ready to fight a major battle." This lawsuit conflicts
with Pring's observation that SLAPP targets are typically "normal, middle-class and blue-collar Americans, many on their first venture into the
world of government decision making."'
Nevertheless, this fact does not preclude the case from SLAPP status.
A major media entity, like a newspaper, may be the target of a SLAPP
suit.' Furthermore, an argument can be made that the University was
little more than a surrogate acting on behalf of average citizens. It was
simply making available to people information directly concerning their
health and safety. The University was fulfilling its duty on behalf of California taxpayers to spread knowledge and information."8 Viewed in this
light, the University is merely a stand-in for the common person.
d.

Conclusion:A new breed of SLAPP?

This analysis suggests that B & W subjected the University to a SLAPP
suit. The company, guarding its business interests, filed suit against
UCSF. It tried to stifle informed public debate on important health issues
by suppressing information that carried enough power to change federal
regulations affecting Big Tobacco.'e Brown & Williamson attempted to
remove debate about the contents of the documents from the court of
public opinion to the court of Judge Pollak. As Pring observed in considering a successful SLAPP suit's impact, "One set of interests has successfully transformed a public, political-arena debate into a private, judicialarena adjudication."'

278. Christopher Patti, who argued the University's case before Judge Pollak, is inhouse counsel for the University of California. See Irresistible Forces, CAL LAW., Mar.
1996, at 26, 34 (providing a brief biography of Patti).
279. Pring, supm note 208, at 3.
280. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
281. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (encouraging a "general diffusion of knowledge and

intelligence").
282. See supra notes 112-34 and accompanying text.
283. Pring, supra note 208, at 12; see also Canan et al., supra note 209, at 929
(providing that "SLAPPs, by definition, are efforts to transform claims made in a public, political arena into legal claims in order to reduce or eliminate their potential

damage").
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For Brown & Williamson, however, it was not a successful SLAPP.
Rather than back down and return the documents, the University fought
the legal battle necessary to keep the information in the public realm. Although the battle temporarily moved into a San Francisco courtroom as
Brown & Williamson desired, today Brown & Williamson fights on multiple fronts. The documents provided powerful evidence against the company in a recent $750,000 jury verdict against the corporation in Florida.' It may be too late, to paraphrase Judge Pollak's statement during
oral argument, to SLAPP the genie back in the bottle.'
3.

The World Wide Web as Strategic Litigation Weapon

A legal battle that transpires in Silicon Valley's front yard is not complete without a high technology angle. The Brown & Williamson fight
with UCSF featured just this twist. It was not, however, the type of
technology question usually associated with legal issues in the world of
Apple, Oracle, and Adobe. It did not involve an intellectual property
question of copyrights, patents, or software development. Instead, it featured the potential use of the Internet and, in particular, the graphics-rich
portion of the Internet known as the World Wide Web (Web), by the
University as a weapon against Brown & Williamson.
The parties neither fully briefed, nor formally argued as a separate
issue, the use of the Web as a legal tool by UCSF.' That issue arose,
however, during oral argument by Barbara Caulfield, counsel for Brown
& Williamson, at the crucial May 25, 1995, hearing.'
Caulfield's high technology concern? That UCSF would post the pilfered documents on the Web, thereby making them accessible for downloading by attorneys involved in other litigation against Brown & Williamson.'s In addition, Caulfield feared that disclosure of the documents on

284. Mark Curriden, A Fortress Up in Smoke, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1996, at 30.
285. See Court Transcript of May 25, 1995 Hearing at 60, Regents of Univ. of CaL

(No. 967298).
286. Brown & Williamson touched on the issue of using the Web as a strategic litigation weapon briefly in its written arguments. For instance, attorneys for the tobacco company argued that the "case is a stark demonstration of why such an action

[for conversion] is necessary in the age of the information superhighway." Reply
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Application for Writ of Possession at 1, Regents of Univ. of CaL (No. 967298).
287. See Court Transcript of May 25, 1995 Hearing at 18, Regents of Univ. of CaL
(No. 967298).

288. See id

the Web would defeat whatever attorney-client privileges might protect
them in other litigation.'s As Caulfield told the judge:
[W]e come to this court, as an equity court, to try to say we would like to have
the day in court that is allowed under the privilege laws without having theft take
away the privilege. Because in the information superhighway, your honor, once
this document is stolen, it goes on the Internet There isn't, a privilege that exists.21

Caulfield also analogized the Brown & Williamson situation to one

involving the disclosure of trade secrets on the Web.29 She claimed
that the attorney-client privilege, a discovery and litigation privilege,
created a property right in the copies of the documents analogous to a
trade secret property right.' Caulfield argued:
[I1f this was a formula for Coca-Cola, that had this been stolen and given to the
library and the library.was going to put it on the Internet, the question would be
can you disseminate as to property rights like that? We are stating the same analysis. And the courts have repeatedly said no. But there is a property right in that
formuls. There is a property right in reserve, that one student does [sic] that can't
be stolen and disseminated. What we are saying is that there is a property right in
privilege.'

Judge Pollak, as noted earlier, rejected the argument that the attorneyclient privilege created a property right in the documents.' He emphasized, however, that his decision did not preclude Brown & Williamson
from attempting to exclude those documents in other cases under the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine.'
The real problem with posting the documents on the Web was not that
it might create a waiver of protected privileges.29 Brown &
Williamson's claim of the attorney-client privilege in its litigation against
UCSF was enough under California law to prevent a waiver of that privi-

289. See id, This possibility is somewhat questionable. Brown & Williamson, as
holder of whatever attorney-client privilege might protect the documents, did not
consent to the disclosure of the information in its documents. See CAL EvID. CODE
§ 912 (West 1995) (providing waiver of attorney-client privilege by disclosure). Under
California law, "[c]onsent to disclosure is manifested by any statement or other conduct of the holder of the privilege indicating consent to the disclosure, including
failure to claim the privilege in any proceeding in which the holder has the legal
standing and opportunity to claim the privilege." Id. By arguing the existence of the
privilege against UCSF, Brown & Williamson clearly had not failed to claim the privilege.
290. Court Transcript of May 25, 1995 Hearing at 18, Regents of Univ. of CaL (No.
967298).
291. Id. at 31.
292. Id,
293. Id
294. Id, at 54.
295. Id. at 61.
296. See id.
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lege.2n It could litigate the application of the, privilege in other fora.'
Instead, the real danger lay in the public dissemination of the information contained in those documents.
Even if a document could be excluded as evidence in another case
against Brown & Williamson, the information contained in that document would still be known by opposing counsel if UCSF were allowed to
put it on the Web. That information, in turn, could shape in-court arguments, lead investigators and jurors down otherwise untaken paths, and
influence federal regulation of the tobacco industry.
Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the documents will be excluded on privilege grounds in other arenas. They can be downloaded by
plaintiffs' attorneys directly off the Web and admitted into evidence over
objections by counsel for Brown & Williamson. Indeed, a Florida court
admitted the documents into evidence for the first time in a 1996 trial in
which a jury rendered a $750,000 verdict against Brown & William2
son. M

The harm to Brown & Williamson caused by posting the documents on
the Web is thus not confined to the litigation with UCSF. The harm proliferates in other fora and in other cases, pending or potential, against
the tobacco company. Posting documents on the Web increases the
speed, accessibility, and ease with which otherwise privileged information is disseminated to tobacco-hostile counsel. Attorneys litigating
against Brown & Williamson can take short cuts around normal discovery procedures to receive those documents. For example, by using a Web
browser like Netscape, opposing counsel can link to a UCSF site to find
the documents.'
Today, after Judge Pollak's decision against Brown & Williamson, such
a site exists."0 This site is a cache packed with powerful ammunition
for plaintiffs' attorneys suing the tobacco industry and for numerous
states' attorneys general pouncing on the beleaguered industry. That
cache can be obtained free of charge and free of hassle by anyone.

297. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 912(a) (West 1995) (providing that failure to claim a
privilege in any proceeding in which the holder of that privilege has legal standing
and the opportunity to claim it may constitute a waiver of the privilege).
298. See Court Transcript of May 25, 1995 Hearing at 61, Regents of Univ. of Cal

(No. 967298).
299. Curriden, supra note 284, at 30.
300. GLarrz rr AL, supra note 2, at 11. The documents can be accessed for free
on the Web at <http://www.galen.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/>.
301. GLi'ET
gr AL, supra note 2, at 11.

Plaintiffs' attorneys need not concern themselves with discovery disputes
to access them.
Indeed, this~scenario was borne out in the already mentioned Florida
case in which Grady Carter, a sixty-six year old retired air traffic controller who started smoking Lucky Strikes in 1947, recovered a $750,000 jury
verdict against Brown & Williamson.' Norwood Wilner, Carter's attorney, observed that the Brown & Williamson documents posted on the
Web were powerful evidence in the case: "'We had all we needed in the
Brown & Williamson documents, which are now available on CD-ROM
and all over the Internet.'"'
The Web, then, is a powerful litigation weapon. Rapid transmission of
large amounts of documents in a matter of seconds is now possible. The
impact of the information in those documents will be felt for years to
come in litigation across the country. The Web facilitates disclosure of
privileged information, such as medical examination records of a
psychotherapist's patient' or the details of a rape victim's trauma as
described to a sexual assault counselor, to a mass audience."
Damage done by disclosure of a rape victim's confidential conmunications with her counselor can never be rectified by an in-court order excluding those documents as evidence in a particular case. Out-of-court
Web postings may reveal intensely private information. The injuries,
affronts to dignity, autonomy, and privacy, cannot be undone by a
judge's order. Those harms are more egregious than any monetary loss to
purveyors of nicotine-laced products.
Regents of University of California, then, only scratches the surface
as to the power of the Web as a strategic litigation weapon to evade or
circumvent privileges. Documents posted on the Web can facilitate massive actions across the country that target a particular defendant such as
Brown & Williamson. They can also cause irreparable injury to truly
innocent victims of circumstance, such as rape victims.
C. Synopsis of Legal Issues
Part I analyzes three distinct legal and public policy issues raised in
Regents of University of California, the applicability of First Amendment scrutiny to generally applicable state tort laws that do not target
speech, SLAPP suits, and the use of the World Wide Web as a strategic

302. Curriden, supra note 284, at 30.
303. Id (quoting attorney Wilner).
304. See CAL Evi). CODE §§ 1010-1027 (West 1995) (providing California statutory
authority on the psychotherapist-patient privilege).
305. See id. §§ 1035-1036.2 (providing California statutory authority on the sexual
assault victim-counselor privilege).
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litigation weapon." Within these issues, the Article examines questions
about academic freedom, informed public debate, and privacy claims.'
It would be a mistake, however, to consider only the legal issues
raised in the case. Part II of this Article places the battle within a larger
economic and social context, exploring issues of media conglomeration,
self-censorship, and the public service role of universities.' The lawsuit between Brown & Williamson and UCSF is compared with recent
legal disputes between major media news organizations and cigarette
companies. A better understanding of the importance of the UCSF case
is understood when placed within a larger context.
II.

CONTEXTUAIZING THE LEGAL BATTLE: THE DIVERGENT PATHS OF

UCSF AND ABC/CBS
Around the same time that the University of California was slugging it
out in court with Brown & Williamson, two major television news organizations, ABC and CBS, were scurrying for shelter in their respective
fights with Big Tobacco. In particular, ABC settled for several million
dollars in attorneys' fees and an apology in a defamation action brought
by Philip Morris over two "essentially correct " "°9 television broadcasts
about tobacco reconstitution, while CBS pulled a story attacking the
tobacco industry from an episode of 60 Minutes."' Mickey Mouse, it
seemed, was scampering loose around the ABC newsroom, and Westinghouse was generating more than nuclear power over at CBS.3 '

306. See supra Part I.B.
307. Id.
308. See ifra Part B.
309. HILTs, supra note 40, at 114.
310. See infra notes 316-55 and accompanying text.
311. Walt Disney Co. revealed its plans to take over Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. on July
31, 1995. Laura Landro et al., Disney's Deal for ABC Makes Show Business a Whole

New World, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 1995, at Al. The network settled the defamation action ified against it by Philip Morris Co. less than one month later. John Schwartz,
ABC Issues Apology for Tobacco Report, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 1995, at Al. See generally George Garneau, Disney Enters News Business, EDITOR & PUBuSHER, Aug. 5,
1995, at 5 (providing a summary of Disney's takeover of Capital Cities/ABC). On August 1, 1995, just one day after the announcement of the Disney-ABC deal, Westinghouse Electric Corp. agreed to pay $5.4 billion for CBS, Inc. Allan Wolper, Veteran
Journalist Takes on Westinghouse, EDITOR & PUBUISHER, Sept. 16, 1995, at 17.
Westinghouse is "involved in a wide range of enterprises, including the development

of nuclear power." Id.

This portion of the Article contrasts the aggressive First Amendment
defense of the University of California in its fight with Brown & Williamson with the less than courageous actions of two major news organizations in their respective battles with Philip Morris and Brown & Williamson. It analyzes dangers posed to investigative journalism by the growing
"conglomeration juggernaut""' and by rising bottom-line pressures imposed by mega-media corporations that conflict with the ideals of hardhitting reportage. 3 It suggests that when litigious entities like tobacco
companies are the targets of potentially damaging news coverage, major
media outlets can no longer be counted on to deliver important information. Instead, public universities like the University of California, that
face continuing budget crises, may be the last avenue of information
dissemination on those subjects. The situation, in a nutshell, is ominous.
It is not sufficient to view in a vacuum legal issues that affect information flow about events of public concern. Instead, these issues must be
considered within the broader economic framework that often influences
their resolution. That financial framework increasingly privileges out-ofcourt resolution of legal disputes long before expenses for their in-court
resolution are incurred.
ABC, for instance, settled a case with Philip Morris before trial that
caused Harvard constitutional law scholar Laurence Tribe to remark that
"[alnybody with half a brain would advise [ABC] that at the end of the
road they will prevail." 14 He observed that the settlement, however,
"made economic sense" if the network and its owners were concerned
"purely with the corporate bottom line.""1 5
The dispute in Philip Morris Cos. v. ABC"'6 stemmed from two companion segments of the since-canceled ABC newsmagazine Day One,
broadcast in February and March 1994.' The reports, which won a
prestigious George Polk Award for excellence in journalism,"8 focused
on the process of tobacco reconstitution and nicotine manipulation in

312. Gitlin, supra note 35, at 1.
313. A journalist's goals do not include providing corporate owners with massive
dividends. "The only relevant issue in journalism is whether the editorial product is
as honest as fair-minded people can make it, as balanced as possible, as untainted by
either corporate bias or personal bias." NoRMAN E. ISAACS, UNTENDED GATES: THE
MISMANAGED PRESS 154 (1986).
314. Howard Kurtz, Long-Term Effect of ABC Seulement Concerns Critics, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 23, 1995, at A4.

315. Id.
316. 23 Media L Rep. (BNA) 2438 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1995).
317. Day One: Smoke Screen (ABC television broadcast, Feb. 28, 1995); Day One:
Smoke Screen, Part Two (ABC television broadcast, Mar. 7, 1994).

318. Kurtz, supra note 314, at A4.
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the production of cigarettes."
Philip Morris filed a defamation action
°
over the broadcasts.' It contended that ABC, by using terms like
"spiking" and "fortifying," falsely implied that Philip Morris added nicotine from extraneous, outside sources to its cigarettes."2
ABC settled the case, agreeing to pay several million dollars in
attorneys' fees to Philip Morris.' It also issued a narrowly drafted
apology to Philip Morris that the tobacco company gladly republished in
major newspapers throughout the country in full-page advertisements
entitled "Apology Accepted.'
In addition, the network broadcast apologies on its World News Tonight and Monday Night Football programs. 4 Sorry, in stark contrast to the unremorseful character in the
Tracy Chapman ballad Baby Can I Hold You, was all that ABC could

say.uM

319. Weinberg, supra note 27, at 33.
320. Philip Morris Cos., 23 Media L Rep. (BNA) 2438.
321. Id. at 2439.
322. Mark Landler, ABC Settles Suits on Tobacco, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1995, at Al.
Some estimates of the total attorneys' fees range from $15 to $20 million. Alix M.
Freedman & Elizabeth Jensen, Capital Cities, Philip Morris Settle Lawsuit, WAu ST.
J., Aug. 22, 1995, at A3.
323. Weinberg, supra note 27, at 29. Philip Morris ran the apology/advertisement in
approximately 700 publications. Id. at 31. The apology, however, was narrowly tailored and limited in the scope of error admitted by ABC. It provided in pertinent
part:
We [ABC] now agree that we should not have reported that Philip Morris
adds significant amounts of nicotine from outside sources. That was a mistake that was not deliberate on the part of ABC, but for which we accept
responsibility and which requires correction. We apologize to our audience
and Philip Morris.
ABC and Philip Morris continue to disagree about whether the principal focus
of the reports was on the use of nicotine from outside sources. Philip Morris
believes that this was the main thrust of the programs. ABC believes that the
principal focus of the reports was whether cigarette companies use the reconstituted tobacco process to control the levels of nicotine in cigarettes in
order to keep people smoking. Philip Morris categorically denies that it does
so. ABC thinks the reports speak for themselves on this issue and is prepared to have the issue resolved elsewhere.
Id.
324. Alix Freedman et al., Why ABC Settled with the Tobacco Industry, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 24, 1995, at B1.
325. See TRACY CHAPMAN, Baby Can I Hold You, on TRACY CHAPMAN (Elektra/Asylum
Records 1988) (singing "{sorry is all that you can't say/years gone by and still words
don't come easily/like sorry like sorry").

Author and New York Times reporter Philip J. Hilts observed that
ABC's decision to settle and to apologize "was not a legal decision, but a
business judgment. In fact, the odds of winning for ABC were rather
good, for reasons not. made public at the time. And ABC lawyers had
tested their arguments and theories before two mock juries in the South,
and had won."" ABC even won a critical discovery motion protecting
the identity of its confidential sources, including one fittingly dubbed
"Deep Cough." ' 7
Communication scholar and media gadfly Marshall McLuhan once
remarked that the "medium is the message."'
It appears that today
some members of the broadcast news media are on the verge of conveying a new, equally profound message: settlement is the solution.
First Amendment scholar Rodney Smolla observed that "[ciorporate
officers or lawyers who advise [the media] are looking at the bottom line
and the huge expense of playing this litigation out versus the cheapness
of the apology. " ' He suggested the ABC apology may have a slippery
slope effect. "People will start to see (apologizing] as a way of getting
out of a problem they're in."33
From a journalist's perspective, however, the price of an apology is not
cheap. It is paid in a loss of public trust. Although an apology averts
monetary losses, credibility and integrity, a reporter's stock in trade, are
irreparably damaged.33 Reese Cleghorn, president of the American
Journalism Review, lamented that the ABC settlement "hurts all of us,
and it is devastating to ABC's credibility.'s He concluded that the set-

326. HILTS, supra note 40, at 114.
327. Clay Calvert, The Reporter's Privilege vs. The Corporate-InterestMuzzle: Philip
Morris Cos. v. ABC, Inc., 22 U. DAYTON L REv. (forthcoming 1997).
328. MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN 23 (2d ed.
1964). McLuhan's famous quotation, placed in more complete context, is:

In a culture like ours, long accustomed to splitting and dividing all things as
a means of control, it is sometimes a bit of a shock to be reminded that, in
operational and practical fact, the medium is the message. This is merely to
say that the personal and social consequences of any medium-that is, of
any extension of ourselves-result from the new scale that is introduced into
our affairs by each extension of ourselves, or by any new technology.

Id.
329. Patricia G. Barnes, Who's Sorry Now: Media Defendants' High-ProfileApologies
Are Cheaper Than Litigation, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1996, at 20 (alteration in original).
330. Id.
331. It should be emphasized that neither Walt Bogdanich, the producer of the ABC
Day One episodes at issue in the dispute with Philip Morris, nor John Martin, the
correspondent for those segments, signed the settlement agreement. Freedman et al.,
supra note 324, at BI.
332. Reese Cleghorn, Cigarette Settlement Shames ABC, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Oct.
1995, at 4, 4.
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tlement reveals "how ominous the corporatization of the news has
become."' In another article about the ABC capitulation, the American Journalism Review reported that ABC news staff members are
"worried that the bottom-line mentality of corporate owners puts investigative journalism at risk."'
In their 1997 book about influences on the news media, communication scholars Kathleen Hall Jamieson and Karlyn Kohrs Campbell observed that the ABC settlement "aroused fears among employees that
ABC might no longer be as vigilant in protecting news, particularly since
Capital Cities had been acquired by the Walt Disney Company. " '
Jamieson and Campbell suggest that Philip Morris's success in obtaining
an apology from ABC "will make other news outlets more cautious in
their coverage of these issues."'
The damage caused by settlements like ABC's extends beyond harm to
the journalism profession. The public is harmed. Bill Kovach, curator of
the Nieman Foundation at Harvard, observed that the "damage done is
not just to the credibility of ABC's news operation and the chilling effect
it might have on aggressive reporting. There's also the impact on society.
This slows down a movement in the country to question whether or not
cigarettes should be treated as a drug." 7
The danger extends far beyond the tobacco issue. This issue jeopardizes coverage of other matters that impact the public health, safety, and
welfare. The battle with Big Tobacco is simply symptomatic of a potentially larger problem of self-censorship at broadcast news organizations.
Philip Hilts reports in his new book, Smokescreen: The Truth Behind
the Tobacco Industry Cover-up," a particularly dramatic and damning
allegation of self-censorship at ABC after Philip Morris filed its defamation action against the network.' Citing as his source an anonymous
ABC executive involved on the Philip Morris investigation, Hilts suggests
that ABC ignored information in the Brown & Williamson papers, the

333. Id.
334. Robert Lissit, The Uneasy Aftermath of the ABC Settement, Am. JOuRNAuSM
REv., Oct. 1995, at 8, 8.
335. KATHLEEN HALL JAMIFSON & KARLYN KOHRS CAMPBELL, THE INTERPLAY OF INFLUENCE: NEws, ADVERTISING, POLITICS, AND THE MASS MEDIA 145 (4th ed. 1997).

336.
337.
338.
339.

Id. at
Kurtz,
HiLTS,
1d at

146.
supra note 314, at A4.
supra note 40.
120.

same documents containing the same information that Stanton Glantz
and the University of California exposed for all to see. 3 ° Hilts writes:
[B]ecause of the Philip Morris suit, fear ruled. The executive said that Alan
Braverman, in-house counsel for ABC, said not only that ABC should not report
on the [Brown & Williamson] papers, but in an action that stunned those in the
business, the papers were confiscated from news staff. They were ordered to
erase their computer notes about the papers."

This allegation, if true, is deeply troubling. In fairness to ABC, however, it must be noted that the network is "currently in the process of vigorously defending a number of cases, such as the Food Lion suit over a
1992 Prime Time Live hidden camera report alleging the supermarket
chain tricked customers into buying spoiled meat, fish, and poultry."'
On the other hand, attacking one supermarket chain is different than going after one of the most reviled and powerful industries today, tobacco.
A new rule may be emerging-the power and economic resources of the
target dictate the nature and extent of coverage and investigation.
ABC's debacle with Philip Morris is not the only recent example of
media capitulation to a tobacco company. Another involved CBS's flagship television news magazine 60 Minutes and a foe not unknown to
University of California, Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.' As described in Part I of this Article, 60 Minutes canceled a segment that featured an interview with a former Brown & Williamson executive, Jeffrey
Wigand, for fear of monetary liability.' Alix M. Freedman, the Wall
Street Journal reporter who has been called "likely the number one tobacco reporter in the country," 5 observed that the incident "has been
interpreted as a textbook case of how the $45 billion tobacco industry
chills the media or, more precisely, its lawyers. " '

340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Lissit, supra note 334, at 8. See Food lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, 887 F.
Supp. 811 (M.D.N.C. 1995) (denying ABC's motion to dismiss trespass, intentional
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, and related causes of action based on the conduct of
two producers for ABC's Prime Time Live newsmagazine who submitted false employment applications with bogus work histories to Food Lion stores and who Food
lion hired as meat packers).
343. For a recent analysis of both the CBS fight with Brown & Williamson and the
defamation action Philip Morris brought against ABC that searches for the causes of
the networks' cowardice, see Clay Calvert, Stumbling Down Tobacco Road, Media
Sef-Censorship and Corporate Capitulationin the War on the Cigarette Industry, 30
Loy. LA. L REv. 139 (1996).
344. See generally Grossman, supra note 26, at 39-51 (providing an excellent overview of the 60 Minutes fiasco).
345. HILTS, supra note 40, at 145.
346. Freedman et al., supra note 3, at Al.
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CBS faced potential liability over the interview not because of the
substance of what Wigand said, but rather because of the manner in
which CBS induced him to talk17 Wigand had a nondisclosure contract
with Brown & Williamson that forbade him from speaking about the
company.' CBS agreed to indemnify Wigand, however, against a libel
suit that might result from his interview with Mike Wallace."9 The network had previously paid Wigand $12,000 for consulting work on another
report for 60 Minutes." In addition, he "was promised by CBS that his
interview wouldn't be aired without his permission." 1
After completing the interview with Wigand, CBS attorneys ordered the
segment off the air.' The network's attorneys and outside Counsel specializing in First Amendment cases feared monetary liability under the
tort theory of intentional interference with contractual relations.'
The print media bashed CBS for its actions. The New York Times
opined that "[tihis act of self-censorship by the country's most powerful
and aggressive television news program sends a chilling message to journalists investigating [tobacco] industry practices everywhere."'
The
newspaper's editorial added that:
the most troubling part of CBS's decision is that it was made not by news executives but by corporate officers who may have their minds on money rather than
public service these days. With a $5.4 billion merger with the Westinghouse Electric Corporation about to be approved, a multi-billion-dollar lawsuit would hardly
have been a welcome development,"

Thus, the actions of ABC and CBS diverge markedly from the path
steered by the University of California and its attorneys. The next section
describes the growing conglomeration craze that portends more self-censorship in service of corporate profits at major media news outlets.

347. Id.

348. Id.
349. Id,
350. Id.

351. Id.
352. Bill Carter, '60 Minutes' Ordered to Puli Interview in Tobacco Report, N.Y.
TwiEs, Nov. 9, 1995, at Al.

353. DeVore, supra note 100, at B2; see supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text
(describing the legal basis and elements of the theory of intentional interference with
contractual relations).
354. Se-Censorship at CBS, supra note 102, at E14.

355. Id.

A.

The ConglomerationCatastrophe

In Inventing Reality: The Politics of News Media,m Michael Parenti
launches a blistering attack on United States media with the observation
that "[w]e do not have a free and independent press in the United States
but one that is tied by purchase and persuasion to wealthy owners and
advertisers and, subjected to the influences of state power." " It is the
purchase and persuasion of wealthy owners that is most troubling today
when Disney owns ABC, General Electric controls NBC, Westinghouse
takes over CBS, and Time Warner, Inc., merges with Turner Broadcast-

ing.
Conglomerates with diversified portfolios that include both media and
non-media holdings and media entities with concentrated ownership
raise serious concerns. As Leo Bogart, former executive vice president
and general manager of the Newspaper Advertising Bureau, recently
observed, "Concentration in other industries may lead to market power,
oligopolistic pricing and restrictive trade practices. In the media
business, it can change the country's values, ideas and politics, perhaps
even the national character." Todd Gitlin, professor of culture, journalism, and sociology at New York University, concurred. He emphasized
that
mergers are taking place amid a deafening silence. Trusts with the capacity for
overbearing power are being merged and acquired into existence as if there were
nothing at stake but stock values. Today's deals may weigh on the culture for
decades. The potential for harm is at least as impressive as the potential for
good.'

This section focuses narrowly on one change that conglomeration and
concentration of ownership portend: a change in the selection and portrayal of news at media organizations owned by large chains and corporate conglomerates. The change, in a nutshell, is increased self-censorship in service of bottom-line interests.
Professor Louis A. Day of Louisiana State University observed in his
recent book on media ethics that "[plerhaps the most serious threat to
media institutional independence is the trend toward ownership by outside corporations that have no commitment to the journalistic imperative
and spirit. The bottom line often takes precedence over content quality,
which is measured by its profitability. " 3' Emphasizing a similar con-

356.
1993).
357.
358.
15.
359.
360.

MICHAEL PARENT[,

INVENTING REALITY:

THE PoLrcs

OF MASS

MEDIA

(2d ed.

Id. at 4.
Leo Bogart, What Does It AU Mean?, MEDIA STUD. J., Spring-Summer 1996, at
Gitlin, supra note 35, at 6.
LOuis A. DAY, ETHICS IN MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS: CASES AND CONTROVERSIEs 216
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cern, Davis Merritt, a public journalism advocate and practitioner, stated
in a new book on public journalism that "[a]s more and more
newspapers have been acquired by public companies, operating those
companies has become a delicate balancing act between civic responsibility and hard fiscal realities.""
Disney almost certainly did not purchase ABC to improve the quality
of the news operation or to "beef up" investigative journalism. Rather, as
Ken Auletta wrote in a recent edition of the Media Studies Journal, the
"blizzard of mergers and partnerships [in the communications industry] is
motivated by good business reasons."'
How do "outside" corporate parents influence selection and portrayal
of news? How do conglomerates make it more difficult for reporters and
editors to adhere to the admonition set forth in the Society of Professional Journalists' Code of Ethics that "[j]ournalists must be free of obligation to any interest other than the public's right to know"?' How do
corporate conglomerates' needs create conflicts of interest that
jeopardize a journalist's obligations of truthtelling and independence?'
Is the influence the product of direct intervention and edicts by executives to editors and reporters, or is the influence the result of less brutal
means?
Bogart argues that the process is often "subtle and indirect."' He
observed that
[f]ew media overlords are so crude as to give direct orders to kill or slant stories.
They do not have to do that in order to let it be known that their views are where
their interests lie. Almost imperceptible Pavlovian cues reinforce desired behavior
and inhibit what is unwelcome.'

(2d ed. 1997).
361. DAVIS MERRITr, PUBLIC JOURNALISM AND PUBLIC LIFE: WHY TELLING THE NEWS Is

NOT ENOUGH 41 (1995).
362. Ken Auletta, Fourteen Truisms for the Communications Revolution, MEDIA
STUD. J., Spring-Summer 1996, at 29, 30.
363. DAY, supra note 360, at 421.
364. JAY BLACK ET AL, DOING ETHICS IN JOURNALISM: A HANDBOOK WITH CASE STUDIES

17 (2d ed. 1995). Ethicist Jay Black observes that conflicts of interest arise when
individuals face competing loyalties "to their organization's economic needs as opposed to the information needs of the public." XdLat 91.
365. Bogart, supra note 358, at 22.

366. Id

Ben Bagdikian, former dean of the graduate journalism program at
University of California, Berkeley, concurs on the danger of indirect
influence on editorial content. 7 He noted in The Media Monopoly that
the gravest loss is in the self-serving censorship of political and social ideas, in
news, magazine articles, books, broadcasting, and movies. Some intervention by
owners is direct and blunt. But most of the screening is subtle, some not even
occurring at a conscious level, as when subordinates learn by habit to conform to
owners' ideas.'

Newsweek media critic Jonathan Alter, analyzing the potential impact

of Disney's takeover of ABC, observed that "[iln a tight job market, the
tendency is to avoid getting yourself or your boss in trouble. So an adjective gets dropped, a story skipped, a punch pulled. " " In the case of
conglomerates with diverse holdings, there are many "bosses" journalists
must avoid getting in trouble. As Bogart stated, "The larger and more
diversified the company, the greater and the more varied the corporate
interests that may be threatened by crusading journalism."37 In brief,
there are massive incentives for journalists to tread lightly on, or even to

ignore, topics that may negatively affect their own financial security and
the balance sheets of their parent corporations.
Corporate pressures, magnified in this era of rapid conglomerization,
threaten the hallmark of journalism--objectivity.37 The pressure upon
journalists to slant stories that favor a corporate parent or to exclude

information that might cause it. harm continues to increase.
Writing in The New Yorker shortly after Disney's takeover of ABC, Ken
Auletta explicated the tension and friction between the desires of
372
Disney's top gun, Michael Eisner, and the news department at ABC.

Auletta wrote:
Eisner has no natural predilection for journalism. He tends to take a dim view of
reporters; last week, he thanked several journalists for generally favorable pieces,
as if they were choosing his side rather than just reporting his coup [the Capital
Cities/ABC takeover], and he tends to freeze out those whom he views as critics.
Now that Eisner will have responsibility for the most successful broadcast-news
division as well as Cap Cities/ABC's newspapers and magazines-more than a

367. BAGDIKIAN, supra note 29, at 45.
368. Id.
369. Jonathan Alter, A Call for Chinese Walls; Why We Should Keep Journalists out
of the Magic Kingdom, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 14, 1995, at 31, 31.
370. Bogart, supra note 358, at 24.
371. Objectivity means "news devoid of personal opinion and overly subjective judgments." EDMUND B. LAMBETH,

COMMITTED

JOURNALISM: AN ETHIC FOR THE PROFESSION

59 (2d ed. 1992). For an excellent critique of the journalism practice of objectivity,
see Theodore L Glasser, Objectivity Precludes Responsibility, QUiLL, Feb. 1984, at 13.
372. Ken Auletta, Awesome: Michael Eisner's Comeback and His Probable Peace
with Jeffrey Katzenberg Crown a Succession of Mogul Mergers and Breakups That
Tops Anything on TV, NEW YORKER, Aug. 14, 1995, at 28, 31.
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hundred publications-the questions that are already being asked about him are
these: Does he care about the news product, or only about profit margins? Does
he feel some public-trust obligation-as ABC obviously did earlier this year [1995]
when it broadcast a low-rated prime-time hour on the war in Bosnia because the
story was important-or does he only track ratings? Will he find that news, with
its attendant controversy and sometimes uncomfortable questions, detracts from
the friendly Disney image?'

For his part, Eisner promises not to get involved with news issues at
ABC. He told Auletta that "ABC News is the best news organization in
the world.... I know it well. Roone Arledge has brought to ABC News
the same kind of invention that he brought to ABC Sports. They will be
left alone to operate autonomously."374
Tension between business and editorial interests are not unique to
Disney/ABC or Westinghouse/CBS. For instance, the recent dismissal of
New York magazine Editor in Chief Kurt Anderson by leveraged buyout
king Henry R. Kravis, whose K-Ill Communications Corporation had just
taken over the publication, had all the signs of intrusion of ownership
interests into the news room.' Kravis objected to an article that Anderson decided to run about two of Wall Street's most powerful investment bankers."7 Anderson's dismissal, according to New York magazine
film critic David Denby, "is the kind of thing that sends a chill
throughout magazine journalism."' 7
In summary, corporate conglomeration threatens the future of investigative journalism. The ABC and CBS incidents portend a dismal future
for hard-hitting broadcast reportage. The full implications of decreased
government regulation of media ownership3 7 and expanding

373. Id. at 31-32.
374. Id. at 32.
375. Robin Pogrebin, When a Magazine is Too Brash for the Bottom Line, N.Y.
TimEs, Sept. 29, 1996, §3, at 1.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 continues the 1980s movement toward
ownership deregulation in the broadcast industry. See Telecommunications Act of
1996, Pub. L No. 104-104, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 107 (to be codified at 47
U.S.C. § 336). First, it eliminates the cap on the number of AM and FM radio stations that one entity may own or control nationally and relaxes local ownership ceilings. Id. § 202(a)-(b), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 110 (directing the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to modify 47 C.F.R. 73.3555). Second, it eliminates the
cap on the number of television stations that one person or entity may own, operate,
or control nationally, while increasing the national audience reach limitation for television stations owned by one entity from 25 to 35 percent. Id. § 202(c) 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 111 (directing the FCC to modify 47 C.F.R. 73.3555). Third, it

conglomeration will not, however, be known until early in the next
century. As the next section suggests, the trend may force the public to
rely on alternative sources of information for news on controversial or
"taboo" topics and targets.' Universities, interested in fulfilling their
public service missions and integrating service learning into the curriculum, may fill the void created by the broadcast media's abdication."
B.

Filling the Vacuum: Public Universities and Their Presses?

If major broadcast news organizations owned by corporate conglomerates continue to cower in the face of expensive and time-consuming
litigation,'n the public will be substantially harmed. The result will be
the suppression of information of public concern.' That information,
such as the systematically deceptive practices of the tobacco industry,' may be vital for informed public dialogue on issues of public
health, safety, and welfare.' 5 Without informed dialogue, informed democracy disintegrates.
Diversified corporate conglomerates with incidental news organizations
that comprise only a small or incidental part of their total portfolio'
are likely to pull punches and spike stories when their journalists' investigations target specific businesses or issues. These "off limits! stories include investigations that center on the following: (1) wealthy, powerful,
and litigious industries, such as Big Tobacco; (2) industries and/or corporations in which a news organization's own parent company has an ownership or operational interest, such as the nuclear power business in
which both Westinghouse and General Electric, owners of CBS and NBC,
respectively, have vested interests; and (3) hot-button, controversial issues that could lead to advertiser boycotts, thus decreasing revenue to a
news organization's parent company.
The question that arises from this picture is simple but, unfortunately,
its resolution is not. The question is: Who will investigate these indus-

permits a single person or entity to own or control a network of broadcast stations
and a cable system. Id. § 202(f), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 111 (directing the FCC
to modify 47 C.F.R. 76.501).
379. See supra notes 29, 312 and accompanying text.
380. See infra notes 382-94 and accompanying text.

381. See itf-a notes 382-94 and accompanying text.
382. See, e.g., supra notes 27, 309-11, 314-25, 342-53 and accompanying text.
383. See, e.g., supra notes 35, 121-26 and accompanying text.
384. See supra notes 2, 6 and accompanying text.
385. See supra notes 15, 120-21, 143, 155-61, 260, 266-77 and accompanying text.
386. For instance, at 'the post-merger ABC television network, the total profits of
the news division are only 1 percent of the entire Disney company." Tom Wolzien,

The

Big News-Big Business Bargain, MEDIA STUD. J., Spring-Summer 1996, at 109,

110-11.
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tries, corporations, and issues? Alternatively phrased, the query takes the
form: Who will fill the investigative informational vacuum created by increasing corporate conglomerization?
The battle between the University of California and Brown & Williamson certainly suggests one possibility. Public universities, as well as major private post-secondary institutions, may replace the broadcast media
as purveyors of information about topics and industries that the networks will not touch. UCSF was willing to fight the legal battle necessary
to disseminate information of public concern. It took on the vigorous
public service role that ABC and CBS were unwilling to fulfill. Is this the
proper role for research universities? Should they fill the vacancy that
may be left by self-censorship at broadcast news organizations? These
are important questions as the broadcast news media appear on the
verge of defaulting on their civic, albeit not legal, responsibility to inform
the public.
1.

The Service Mission and Service Learning

Part of the mission of public research universities is to conduct research that enlightens society.'? The goals of public and private universities clearly extend beyond hiring professors to generate research to be
read by other professors in obscure academic journals buried deep in the
stacks of overcrowded university libraries. Specifically, public universities have a service mission to their states and to the nation.' Pennsylvania State University communication and pedagogy scholar Jeremy Cohen observed that "the language of service is rapidly gaining an institu"
tional role on American campuses. "
The late Ernest L Boyer, then-president of the Carnegie Foundation
for the Advancement of Teaching and Knowledge, wrote in 1990:

387. See Roger L Geiger, Research Universities in a New Era: From the 1980s to
the 1990s, in IGHER LEARNING [N AmERicA: 1980-2000, at 67, 83 (Arthur Levine ed.,
1993) (stating that contemporary research universities have as their mission "advancing knowledge and providing excellence in education").
388. Public journalism guru Jay Rosen observed in a recent article on the role of
professors as public intellectuals that "Itihe words on my department letterhead read:
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY/A PRIVATE UNIVERSITY IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE." Jay
Rosen, Making Things More Public: On the Political Responsibility of the Media

Intellectual, CRmcAL

STuD. IN MASS

Comm., Dec. 1994, at 363. Rosen then considered

what public service means and what the proper role of the professorate is in light of
the call to public service. Id.

389. Cohen, supra note 34, at 99.

Beyond the campus, America's social and economic crises are growing-troubled

schools, budget deficits, pollution, urban decay, and neglected children, to highlight problems that are most apparent ... Given these realities, the conviction is
growing that the vision of service that once so energized the nation's campuses
must be given new legitimacy. The challenge then is this: Can America's colleges
and universities, with all the richness of their resources, be of greater service to
the nation and the world?'

Service, as Boyer suggests, is a natural function of a university. The
question then becomes whether public service includes professors performing roles traditionally played by investigative journalists. In these
roles, professors would continue to conduct research but with very different goals. Rather than running experiments for the sake of padding
vitaes and publishing them in dust-collecting journals for the tenure
telos, professors would own up to what New York University's Jay Rosen
calls the "political responsibility of intellectuals.""
This role is particularly relevant for the professorate housed in journalism schools and communication departments. Application of their intellectual and professional skills in a forum outside the classroom to matters that directly impact the public health, safety, and welfare of local
cities, communities, and college towns, provides an invaluable public
service. Advanced seminars in print and broadcast reporting in which
students collectively investigate issues of importance to the local community, such as environmental issues, public safety questions, or domestic
violence problems, provide a bridge that spans the holy trinity of teaching, research, and service. They also create a classic opportunity for
journalism students to engage in "service-learning." 2 Publication and
dissemination of such university-sponsored, student- and faculty-produced investigative journalism serves a vital function for democracy,
while allowing universities to fulfill their public service missions.
The economic crunch facing public universities today, however, suggests that it is not realistic for research universities to fill the void created by broadcast journalism self-censorship. Financial resources like
those of the networks, are not available at most public universities for
conducting in-depth investigative journalism on a consistent basis. Thor-

390. ERNEST L BOYER, SCHOLARSHIP RECONSIDERED: PRIORITIES OF THE PROFESSORATE
3 (1990). Boyer observed that "colleges and universities are being asked to account
for what they do and to rethink their relevance in today's world." Id. at 76.
391. Rosen, supra note 388, at 363.
392. See generally Jeremy Cohen & Dennis F. Kinsey, 'Doing Good' and Scholarship: A Service-Learning Study, JOURNALISM EDUCATOR, Winter 1994, at 4 (providing
an explication and example of service learning). Cohen and Kinsey define service
learning as "learning that combines public service with related academic work." Id.

There is "no single definition," however, of the term. Id. at 5. Ultimately, service
learning must have "explicit links to scholarship, and it must respond to explicit
community needs." Id. at 6.
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ough investigative journalism takes time, often a substantial sum of money, and increasingly, in the realm of broadcasting, equipment such as
hidden cameras and microphones.
Furthermore, there is a difference between generating or producing
solid examples of investigative reportage and disseminatingthat product
on a widespread basis. Even if university-sponsored, classroom-produced
investigative reporting occurs, it does not provide a valuable service to
the community if it remains closeted in the classroom. Investigative articles and stories must see the light of day and reach the community before they can help a university to better fulfill its community service
function.
A different, more expansive role for in-house university press services
and publications would be required to fulfill a new dissemination function by universities. That, however, costs money-a scarce resource at
many universities today. Nevertheless, distribution of such information
via resources such as the World Wide Web is feasible and inexpensive.
Student-produced, faculty-sponsored projects can be posted for minimal
expense on a university's home page on the Web. The circulation and
distribution of such information would be substantially less, however,
than if the same story were broadcast on a television news magazine
such as ABC's 20/20.
In considering this expanded role for the university, another problem
that must be addressed is the danger posed by internal conflicts of business interests at a university. For instance, a professor-directed
journalism course investigation that is critical of expansion and growth
in a once-small university town may run counter to that university's own
interests in development. Conflicts such as this raise questions of selfcensorship very similar to those at the networks. Moreover, some issues
may simply be too controversial for dissemination by university press
services and on university home pages.
A further issue, a very relevant one for tenure-track faculty, is whether
the production of investigative pieces would count toward the tenure
process. Without increased incentives for undertaking a new role, the
odds of a university replacing an investigatory function once served by
broadcast media are slim. An in-depth investigation produced by a
professor's journalism class provides a community service function, but
it may not increase that professor's chance of obtaining tenure. Incentives must be supplied by schools if universities are to play an expanded
role in investigatory journalism.'
393. See generally Chris Hammond, Integrating Service and Academic Study. Facul-

A resolution of these issues goes beyond the scope of this Article. This
Article raises them instead for the purpose of generating thoughtful consideration and debate. The contrast between the University of
California's actions and those of ABC and CBS suggests the potential for
an increased service-action role in investigative journalism by public
universities. The possibility cannot be ignored. It may be that universities, however, are ill-suited to fill the growing information void left by
broadcast news organizations.
If universities do not fill the role, a question still remains. Who or what
entity will play that role? This question is critical, complex, and requires
serious debate and dialogue. Unfortunately, this discussion is not occurring. As Todd Gitlin stated, "[Tihe [media] mergers are taking place amid
a deafening silence."'
M.

CONCLUSION

The University of California's in-court victory over Brown & Williamson provides the powerful lesson that tobacco companies are not invincible in judicial settings. Judge Pollak's decision also signalled a victory for
the public, academic freedom, and plaintiffs involved in current and future litigation against the tobacco industry. The documents are now
available for all to see and download via access to UCSF's World Wide
Web home page.'
The lesson that fighting the tobacco industry may pay public service
dividends, however, may be lost on broadcast news organizations such
as ABC and CBS which are apparently more concerned with shareholder
dividends. Increasing conglomeration compounds the problem. Even if
the broadcast news media press could legally disseminate material like
that in Regents of University of California under the court's decision,
the question still arises whether it nonetheless would refrain from publishing the information for fear of potential liability based on its content.
The University of California fought back against what this Article suggests was a SLAPP suit intended to stifle informed discussion on regulating the cigarette industry and its products.
The case also teaches lessons about the use of the World Wide Web as
a litigation weapon. Publication of documents on the Web increases the
likelihood of circumvention of discovery rules and the defeat of litigation
and evidentiary privileges. Although it is easy to attack the cigarette

ty Motivation and Satisfaction in Michigan Higher Education, 1 MICH. J. COMMuNITY
SERVICE LEARNING 21 (1994) (studying motivation and satisfaction of faculty who utilize service learning).
394. Gitlin, supra note 35, at 6.
395. See supra note 4.
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industry for hiding the documents from the public, the University's use
and threatened use of the Web to display those documents is problematic.
Finally, this Article suggests that major public and private universities
may be the entities necessary to fill the information vacuum created by
self-censorship at major corporate news organizations. An ideal service
learning opportunity presents itself.' Numerous obstacles currently
stand in the way of such an increased action-service role for universities
and, in particular, for the journalism programs and departments within
those universities. The idea, however, cannot be ignored. Discussion and
dialogue must replace silence in the face of increasing conglomeration of
the news business.

396. See generally Dwight E. Giles, Jr. & Janet Eyler, The Theoretical Roots of Service-Learning in John Dewey: Toward a Theory of Service-Learning, 1 MICH. J. COMMUNITY SERVICE LEARNING 77 (1994) (providing an excellent explication on the theory
of service learning).

